18. Instead of formally declaring a state of emergency in line with Article 31 of the Constitution, the Government of Ghana decided to use a range of laws to combat the pandemic. Some of these laws were enacted prior to the pandemic, while others were made during the pandemic. In 1994, the Ghana Parliament passed the Emergency Powers Act 1994 (Act 472) to ‘provide for powers to be exercised in cases of state of emergency and for related matters’.21 This Act supplemented the provisions of the Constitution in Article 31 on states of emergency. The Emergency Powers Act grants extensive powers to the President during a state of emergency, including the power to ‘detain or restrict the movement of persons’, ‘deport or expel non-Ghanaian citizens’, ‘take over property’, ‘search premises without a warrant’ and ‘suspend the operation of a law’.22 The operation of the Emergency Powers Act is subject to the oversight role of Parliament in Article 31 of the Constitution. This oversight role would enable Parliament to control, renew or revoke declarations of emergency. The Government has not triggered or utilised any provisions of the Emergency Powers Act to fight the pandemic. The Government’s use of the Emergency Powers Act would have required a declaration a state of emergency pursuant to Article 31 of the Constitution but so far the Government of Ghana has not considered it necessary.
19. Another statute of relevance to the fight against the pandemic is the aforementioned Public Health Act 2012 (Act 851) passed by the Ghana Parliament in 2012.23 Section 169 of the Act empowers the Minister of Health to declare a public health emergency by executive instrument where there is a situation that poses an immediate risk to health, life, property, or the environment. In March 2020, the Minister of Health declared through executive law-making a public health emergency through the Declaration of Public Health Emergency (Coronavirus [Covid-19] Pandemic) Instrument, 2020 (EI 61).24 This instrument, which was made without any reference to the Parliament, had no specified duration but was clearly meant to remain in force till the pandemic was over. The Public Health Act 2012 authorises the Minister of Health upon a declaration of a public health emergency to ‘direct a public health official to respond immediately to a public health emergency and may order an individual to take preventive measures or be quarantined’. The Minister may also authorise ‘a public health official… to act outside the area of authority of the public health officer’.25 The Government hardly used the provisions of the Public Health Act in fighting the pandemic, except for the aforementioned EI 61 instrument.
20. By far, the most intrusive, dominant, and controversial piece of legislation introduced by the Government of Ghana to address the pandemic is the Imposition of Restrictions Act 2020 (Act 1012) (‘IRA Act’). This law was introduced in Parliament on 18 March 2020,26 and came into force on 21 March 2020, spanning just a period of 4 days from its introduction in Parliament to it coming into force. The law is anchored on Article 21(4)(c), (d), and (e) of Clause 4 of the Constitution, which stipulates that:
21. Based upon these constitutional limitations, the IRA Act empowers the President to impose restrictions on persons by executive instrument, to give effect to Article 21(4)(c), (d), and (e) of Clause 4 of the Constitution ‘in the event or imminence of an emergency, disaster or similar circumstance to ensure public safety, public health and protection.’27 By its stated objects or preamble, the IRA Act applies to ‘an emergency, disaster or similar circumstance’.28 In that context, it was designed as a statute of general application to be triggered or applied to all ‘emergencies or similar situations’. The IRA is premised on the fact that an emergency exists although as noted above the Government has refused or neglected to declare a formal state of emergency under Article 31 and the Emergency Powers Act. Furthermore, the IRA has no sunset provisions as it is framed as a general law to be used by Government whenever an emergency exists. This raises substantial doubt as to whether the IRA Act is consistent with the constitutional framework for addressing states of emergencies. This is because its framework appears to be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution on declarations of states of emergencies, particularly on parliament’s role as a countervailing force in reviewing, renewing. or revoking a state of emergency as necessary.
22. The IRA Act contains peculiar and unusual criminal provisions by Ghanaian constitutional standards. In Ghana, as in many other common law jurisdictions, the legal analysis of criminal offences first looks at the provision(s) creating the offence(s) and then the provision(s) defining the offence(s). This IRA Act creates a criminal offence in Section 6 of the Act, which states that it is a criminal offence punishable by ‘a fine of not less than one thousand penalty units (GHS 12,000) and not more than five thousand penalty units (GHS 60,000) or to a term of imprisonment of not less than four years and not more than ten years or to both’ (one penalty unit = GHS 12) if a person fails to comply with a restriction imposed under the executive instrument issued by the President.29 This means the IRA creates but does not define any criminal offence, which is to be defined or specified by the President through an executive instrument. Instead, the power to define the criminal offence created by Section 6 of the IRA Act has been delegated to the President of Ghana, who has exercised this delegated power by issuing a number of executive instruments to tackle the pandemic.30
23. Many learned commentaries have cast doubt on the constitutionality of the IRA Act.31 It has been argued that the Imposition of Restrictions Act 2020 cannot pass the crucible of constitutionality since it seeks to address a situation of emergency while sidestepping the prescribed mechanisms in Article 31 of the Constitution for dealing with a state of emergency.32 Furthermore, the authority conferred on the President by Parliament under the Impositions of Restrictions Act 2021 to specify and define the criminal offences (restrictions) the President considers necessary to combat the pandemic allows for the adoption and revision of measures without any additional recourse to Parliament by the President. At the same time, it appears to have created an uncertain legal situation. Section 6 of the IRA Act empowers the creation of offences through executive instruments made by the President, ie those imposing penalties for failing to comply with new restrictions. Conversely, as the President removes any restrictions imposed by a previous executive instrument, the hitherto complete criminal offence—Section 6 of the IRA Act creating the offence plus the restriction imposed by the President in the EI defining the criminal offence—becomes incomplete as it now lacks the definition of the criminal offence, that is, the ingredients of the criminal offence to be prescribed by the President through an executive instrument.
24. In effect, the IRA Act authorizes the President by way of a legal instrument to define the criminal offence, review, and repeal the restriction without any reference to Parliament.33 By Ghanaian constitutional standards, this broad conferment of power on the President to define, review, and repeal criminal provisions without any recourse to Parliament appears unprecedented. This appears to be the first time since the adoption of the 1992 Constitution that the President has been empowered by an Act of Parliament to define a crime (provide for the ingredients of the crime) through an executive instrument and revise, amend, and repeal the definition of the criminal offence through an executive instrument, without any reference to Parliament. The only other example that comes close to the present situation was the power granted the first President of Ghana in Section 55 of the 1960 Constitution to enact specific laws without any reference to Parliament.34
25. The IRA Act has other due process concerns. The provision of a punishment regime in Section 6 of the IRA Act, in anticipation of the President specifying or defining the crime by an EI which Section 6 of the IRA Act covers, goes against the grain of legal doctrine and the constitutional structure for the allocation of powers to the legislative and the executive arms of Government. It is doubtful whether an EI could be used to specify the mens rea and/or actus reus requirements of the crime created by Section 6 of the IRA Act. By legal doctrine and Ghana’s constitutional practice, EIs are never used to enact or define crimes.35 Instead, they are used to execute or implement (but not to make) law, for example, by issuing a deportation order, compulsorily acquiring property, or specifying the date when a law passed by Parliament will come into effect.36 It would therefore appear that the power vested in the President by Parliament to define offences by an EI without any further reference to Parliament constitutes an impermissible trespass of legislative space by the executive with the manifest approval of Parliament.
26. Arguably, the regulatory or administrative state cannot survive if it is legally impermissible to employ the mechanism of delegated legislation to set new and binding regulatory standards without prior reference to the legislature. In the specific context of Ghana, Article 11(7) of the Constitution stipulates, among others, that any Order, Rule or Regulation made by a person or authority under a power conferred by this Constitution or any other law shall ‘come into force at the expiration of twenty-one sitting days after being so laid unless Parliament before the expiration of the twenty-one days, annuls the Order, Rule or Regulation by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all members of Parliament.’37 However, the apex court in Ghana has held that Article 11(7) of the Constitution applies only to orders, rules, and regulations that are legislative as opposed executive in character.38 Clearly, the power accorded the President under the IRA Act to specify and define conduct that constitutes criminal offences partake of the exercise of legislative and not executive authority. The specification of conduct that constitutes a criminal offence is a quintessential legislative act.
27. What is more, by the requirements of the right to fair trial under Article 19(11) of the Constitution, a criminal offence must be defined in a ‘written law’. In Ghana, all criminal offences are defined in a law passed by Parliament. Conversely, the IRA has empowered the President to define the crime (the restriction) needed to combat the pandemic through an EI. Because EIs by definition are not supposed to have a ‘legislative character’, the Supreme Court of Ghana has held that EIs are not subject to Article 11 of the Constitution,39 which as noted above requires that orders, rules, and regulations made by a person or authority under a power conferred by this Constitution or any other law shall, among others, be laid in Parliament and ‘come into force at the expiration of 21 sitting days after being so laid’. Thus, based on Ghana’s constitutional law doctrine and practice, it is more likely than not that the EIs issued by the President under the IRA Act will not pass the test of ‘written law’ in Article 19(11) of the Constitution. If this view is correct, it will call into question the lawfulness of the trial, conviction, and sentence of persons who have been convicted and sentenced for breaching the physical and social distancing protocols and rules issued by the President through a number of EIs.40 At the time writing, the courts have not decided any legal challenges to the IRA Act along these lines.