4.1.1 The constitutional power to appoint, promote, transfer, and discipline public prosecutors
The constitutions in Francophone Africa usually provide that public prosecutors and judges are to be appointed by the president of the republic or in some cases, upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice based on the advice or opinion of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM)—which could be compared with the Judicial Service Commission in common law jurisdictions.27 A close relationship of dependence and control ensues due to many factors. First, the vague language used, indicating that the CSM only expresses an opinion or gives advice means that there is no strict obligation to comply with this. This is particularly problematic because of the weak system of judicial review over executive actions in Francophone Africa. In those few Francophone jurisdictions which have introduced some form of judicial review along lines closer to the American model of judicial review than the French model of control of constitutional review through the Conseil Constitutionnel—the best example of which is Benin—the courts have sometimes intervened to check executive abuse. For instance, as far as appointments are concerned, the Constitutional Court of Benin has consistently held that the silence or failure of the president to appoint a magistrate as a judge or prosecutor following the recommendations of the CSM amounts to a violation of the constitution. The Court had previously held, while undertaking the constitutional review of the Act on the CSM, that the latter has a prominent role in Page Id: 366ReferencesConstitution of Burkina Faso: June 11, 1991 (as Amended to November 5, 2015) (Burkina Faso [bf])Main Text, Title VIII The Judiciary, Art.134 OCWConstitution of the Republic of Bénin (Law No. 90-32): December 2, 1990 (Benin [bj])Title VI Judicial Power, Art.129 OCWConstitution of the Republic of Cameroon: June 2, 1972 (as Amended to April 14, 2008) (Cameroon [cm])Main Text, Part V JUDICIAL POWER, Art.37(3) OCWConstitution of the Republic of Senegal: January 22, 2001 (as Amended to May 11, 2018) (Senegal [sn])Main Text, Title VIII The Judiciary, Art.90 OCW(p. 367) safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. According to the Court, the related provision of the law had to be amended to make it clear that the recommendations of the CSM bind the president of the republic in the appointment of judicial officers.28
Second, although the CSM is supposed to play a key role in the management of judicial officers, including public prosecutors and judges, it is not really an independent body that is capable of taking impartial decisions. Most of the constitutional provisions dealing with the judiciary in Francophone Africa state that the president of the republic is the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary.29 The CSM is only supposed to assist the president of the republic to discharge this function. In most of these countries, the CSM is packed with officials directly or indirectly appointed by the president mainly from the executive and some from the judiciary and the legislature. This is confounded by the fact that in the same countries, the president of the republic acts as the president of the CSM and his Minister of Justice as vice-president.30 They also draw up the agenda and convene meetings of the CSM. It is thus an illusion to require a body that operates in such a manner under the control of the president and his minister to make recommendations to them or even ‘assist’ them as some constitutions state. As a matter of fact, the French structure of the judiciary which most Francophone African countries inherited at independence, has since undergone radical changes from the late 2000s. For instance, in the course of its constitutional reforms of 2008, France excluded both the president of the republic and the Minister of Justice from membership of the CSM. Hardly any African country in Francophone Africa has done this.31
Third, the scope for independent action is limited because of the extensive powers of the CSM over the public prosecutors as well as judges on all matters relating to appointments, promotions, transfers, and discipline. Besides this, some of the constitutional measures entrenched to protect judges do not apply to public prosecutors. For example, some constitutions expressly provide that judges may not be transferred without their consent even in cases of promotion;32 no similar provisions are made for prosecutors. Again many constitutions expressly limit the provisions which prohibit arbitrary dismissal of judicial officers only to judges33 and in those cases where there is silence regarding security of tenure for prosecutors, the relevant laws Page Id: 367ReferencesConstitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: February 18, 2006 (as Amended to January 20, 2011) (Congo, The Democratic Republic of the [cd])Main Text, Title III The Organization and the Exercise of Power, Chapter 1 The Institutions of the Republic, s.4 Judicial Power(1) General Provisions, Art.152 OCWConstitution of the Republic of Bénin (Law No. 90-32): December 2, 1990 (Benin [bj])Title VI Judicial Power, Art.126 OCWConstitution of the Republic of Cameroon: June 2, 1972 (as Amended to April 14, 2008) (Cameroon [cm])Main Text, Part V JUDICIAL POWER, Art.37(3) OCWConstitution of the Republic of the Congo: December 22, 2001 (Congo [cg])Title VIII The Judicial Power, Art.141 OCWLaw on judicial organisation (Benin [bj]) Law No 2001-37Title I, Art.5(p. 368) organizing the functioning of the judiciary and the status of judges grant full discretion to the executive when it comes to appointing, moving, or removing prosecutors.34 For example, in Benin, article 6(2) of the Loi portant Statut de la Magistrature, provides that
magistrates of the Ministère Public [that is public prosecutors] may be moved without promotion by a Cabinet decree, from one post to another, upon their own request or automatically—as a matter of course—in the interest of the public service after the opinion of the CSM.
More generally, the executive also exercises control over prosecutors and other legal officers who work within the Ministère Public, through the Minister of Justice. A quite illustrative case is the one of Cameroon, where a Permanent Disciplinary Commission is set up within the Ministry of Justice to deal only with disciplinary matters relating to prosecutors.35 Besides the CSM, the executive also holds various subordination strings namely through the Minister of Justice, and factors that are inherent to the system but also to the judicial officers themselves.
4.1.2 The control exercised through subordination to the Ministry of Justice
This control can be exercised in two main ways. First, the judiciary depends on executive provisions for its budget and logistics. Second, judicial officers, particularly public prosecutors, depend not only on the Ministry of Justice but also on several other ministries. Third, the judiciary has seemingly developed a type of ‘sociological dependency’ vis-à-vis the executive.
Regarding the first point, due to its direct involvement in the management of judicial officers, the executive in Francophone Africa is also the custodian of the financial and logistical resources needed for the proper administration of justice, and therefore the functioning of the Ministère Public. For instance, the budget of the Supreme Court, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, and in fact that of the entire judiciary is part of the general state budget managed by the executive. Courts and judicial officers, including the public prosecutor, do not therefore receive resources directly from the allocation voted by parliament but from the budget allocated to the executive.36 Studies focusing on the independence of courts in Francophone countries, including Africa, have shown that financial autonomy and security are key to the independence of the judiciary from both the executive and legislature.37 In such circumstances, it is difficult for public prosecutors to perform their functions independently where the executive has the discretion to decide what resources will be made available to them. Page Id: 368ReferencesDecree on the status of the judiciary (Cameroon [cm]) Decree No 95/048Law on judicial organisation (Benin [bj]) Law No 2001-37Title I, Art.6(p. 369) Furthermore, since the public prosecutor, who is under the authority of the executive, may be a party in the trial in which the government has increasingly had interest, possibilities of controlling the administration of justice are real.38
The second factor relates to the multiple hierarchical systems to which the public prosecutor responds. Public prosecutors are not only under the hierarchical dependence of the Ministry of Justice but also subordinate to both the Ministries of Interior and Defence. Indeed, investigating officers in the police and gendarmerie discharge prosecutorial functions under the direct control of these two ministries. These links further limit the possibility of an independent and fearless discharge of prosecutorial functions as prosecutors are under the control and authority of multiple executive ministerial agencies. Such situations have impacted directly on the opportunity, scope, and outcome of prosecution especially where the executive itself is an actual or potential litigant. The effect is that whether it is the executive or private parties, the wealthier or more powerful party has shown a potential to dictate the direction of prosecution.39
A last ancillary factor is manifested by the inherent tendency of the Francophone African magistrat to entertain a culture of subordination, particularly vis-à-vis the executive. All Francophone countries in Africa have copied the French model of recruiting judges and prosecutors through National Schools of Administration and Judicial Training. Access to the schools are open to young law graduates who undergo a two-year training programme after which they are appointed to perform judicial functions, including prosecuting complex matters. With little or no experience, these junior judicial officers are especially vulnerable to taking instructions from third parties, especially the executive. In Africa where the culture of bowing to the wishes of the chief or elders in society is well-entrenched, only bold prosecutors can disobey the premier magistrat.40
The general trend in Francophone Africa is that judicial officers are often recruited early in their careers and retire by the age of 65. It may, therefore, be argued that they join the judiciary at a time when they are too inexperienced and immature to withstand executive pressure. In addition, since professional advancement requires only fifteen years’ experience in the judiciary to be eligible to sit in the Supreme Court for instance, it is not surprising that judges sitting in the top court are only in their forties or fifties, where they are expected to officiate as the ‘most senior members of the judiciary’.41 Moreover, judicial officers in Francophone Africa are not recruited on the basis of their experience in legal practice but rather fresh from the famous National Schools of Administration and Judicial Training with no experience other than a one-year internship in lower courts.
(p. 370) Another major avenue through which the executive is able to influence the functioning of public prosecutors is through the so-called power of instructions and recommendations that can be issued by the Minister of Justice to public prosecutors. Through this mechanism, the Minister of Justice may indirectly influence the decision of the public prosecutor in any pending matter through the Ministère Public. If one considers the fact that the power to decide whether or not to prosecute a criminal offence is at the heart of the functions and the independence of the public prosecutor then it is easy to imagine what implications this might have in practice. It therefore means the public prosecutor’s discretion is no longer unfettered.
In fact, all codes of criminal procedure in Francophone Africa are couched in language similar to article 30 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that:
The Minister of Justice may report to the Procureur général of the Appeal Court, responsible for all prosecutions within the jurisdiction of that court, any breach of the criminal law which comes to his knowledge and enjoin him, through written instructions … to initiate criminal proceedings or seize the competent court with such submissions which the Minister deems fit.42
Laws on the status of the Magistrature, which is composed of judges, public prosecutors, and judicial officers working within the Ministry of Justice, emphasize the importance of the role of the Minister of Justice by providing that public prosecutors, in the discharge of their functions, must follow instructions given by the hierarchical authority—which is ultimately the Minister of Justice.43 Even Côte d’Ivoire, which during its reforms tried to enhance the guarantees for judicial independence (including public prosecutors) in its 2000 constitution, conferred similar powers to the Minister of Justice.44 In Cameroon, article 134(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that only judicial authorities may instruct the public prosecutor to initiate or drop criminal proceedings.45 This apparently progressive stance is virtually neutralized by article 64(1) of the same Code which states that the prosecutor may, upon the written authorization of the Minister of Justice, request that criminal proceedings are halted at any stage when such is likely to endanger public peace and interest. Furthermore, some laws take away the discretion of the prosecutor to freely make oral submissions contrary to written ones filed upon the instructions of the Minister of Justice as encompassed by the well-known judicial maxim: ‘la plume est serve mais la parole Page Id: 370ReferencesCode of Criminal Procedure (Benin [bj])Code of Criminal Procedure (Cameroon [cm])Code of Criminal Procedure (as amended) (France [fr])Legislative Part, Book I Exercise of Public Prosecution and Judicial Investigation, Title I Authorities in Charge of Public Prosecution and of Judicial Investigation, Ch.Ibis Responsibilities of the Minister of Justice, Art.30Code of Penal Procedure (as amended) (Senegal [sn]) Basic Law No 65-61(p. 371) est libre’.46 For instance, while the law in Senegal places no conditions on free oral submissions in courts, Cameroonian law subordinates such submissions to prior and timely notification to their immediate hierarchical authority.47 The possibility thus allows for the Minister of Justice to influence the course of prosecution and provides considerable scope for direct or indirect interference with the functioning of the administration of justice and respect for the rule of law. This can hardly be reconciled with the constitutional provisions in most Francophone constitutions which state categorically that all judicial officers in the discharge of their duties must be independent and act in accordance with the law only.48 Since both judges and prosecutors pursue the same goal, that of protecting society against criminal activities and upholding the law, it can be argued that they should be protected by the same rules and enjoy the same independence in their functions.
The continuous scope for wide ranging interference by the executive in the work of the public prosecutors in Francophone Africa is quite at odds with reforms in France, the country from which the present system was borrowed. However, it needs to be said that the French reforms were probably due more to their desire to conform to European standards dictated upon it by a series of judgments of the ECHR than a deliberate attempt to free public prosecutors from the stranglehold of the executive.49 France’s highest courts have shifted jurisprudential positions following the ECHR’s judgments. Before the ECHR’s judgments, both the Court of Cassation and Constitutional Council were of the view that the prosecutor with its current features may discharge judicial functions despite its obvious lack of independence vis-à-vis the executive.50 Immediately after the Medvedyev and Moulin judgments by the Strasbourg Court, the French courts reversed their precedents and decided that the prosecutor is not a judicial authority in the sense of the convention as he lacks independence and impartiality, and is a party to the trial.51
A number of recent cases and incidents in some jurisdictions in Francophone Africa aptly illustrate the pressures that public prosecutors come under as a result of executive interference. The first concerns the attempts to prosecute the former Chadian president, Hissène Habré, for alleged crimes against humanity committed during his time in power. After relentless international pressure was brought to bear on the Senegalese Page Id: 371ReferencesAmendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Decision No 93-326 DC, JORF No 188, 15 August 1993, 11599, 11th August 1993, France; Constitutional CouncilConstitution of the Gabonese Republic: March 26, 1991 (as Amended to April 22, 1997) (Gabon [ga]) Law No 3/91Title V Judicial Power, I Judicial Authority, Art.68 OCWConstitution of the Republic of Burundi: March 18, 2005 (Burundi [bi])Main Text, Title VIII THE JUDICIAL POWER, Art.209 OCWConstitution of the Republic of Cameroon: June 2, 1972 (as Amended to April 14, 2008) (Cameroon [cm])Main Text, Part V JUDICIAL POWER, Art.37(2) OCWDecision, 10th March 1992, France; Court of Cassation [Cass]Medvedyev and ors v France, Merits and just satisfaction, App No 3394/03, 10th July 2008, Council of Europe; European Court of Human Rights [ECHR]Moulin v France, Merits and just satisfaction, App No 37104/06, 23rd November 2010, Council of Europe; European Court of Human Rights [ECHR]X, Appeal No 10-83674, 15th December 2010, France; Court of Cassation [Cass]; Criminal Division(p. 372) authorities, he was finally indicted in 2000 by Senegal judge, Demba Kandji. The former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, when presiding over his first meeting of the CSM, decided to remove Kandji from his position as investigating magistrate, while the case against Habré was still ongoing. During the same meeting, the CSM decided to promote Cheickh Tidiane Diakhaté, President of the Indictment Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Dakar, to the position of judge of the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Senegal. The state’s appeal against Kandji’s decision was still pending before the Court of Appeal of Dakar, which was due to hand down its judgment within three days of the appointment of Diakhaté. The Court of Appeal eventually reversed the indictment, and this led to the decade-long judicial saga that ensured Habré immunity until the establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system after President Wade left power in 2012. Besides, both decisions of the CSM were made immediately after the president of the republic had appointed as his personal legal advisor, Advocate Madické Niang, then lead counsel for Habré in the matter pending before the Senegalese courts.52
A second example comes from Benin in the so-called Talon case, which has been in the news since 2011 to the time of this publication. After allegedly sponsoring Boni Yayi’s successful bid for the presidency in 2006 and again in 2011, prominent Beninese businessman Patrice Talon obtained a number of lucrative public contracts as reward for his efforts. Having, according to his subsequent declaration, opposed Yayi’s project to amend the constitution and stand for a third term, Talon fell out with the president. The businessman was then accused of planning a coup and plotting to poison the president. Fearing for his life, he went into exile in France. The executive then proceeded to cancel all contracts previously awarded to him and seized his companies on the basis of national interest and through non-judicial processes. Meanwhile, arrest and extradition warrants were issued against him. The president lost two cases he brought against him in French courts.53 However, what is of interest here is the case brought before the Benin courts against the president’s personal bodyguard, maid, private doctor, and former minister for collaborating with Talon in the poisoning plot to assassinate the president. The first instance investigating judge, Angelo Houssou, who ordered the release of the accused on 17 May 2013 for lack of evidence was kept under house of arrest by the executive for a couple of months and eventually fled to the US where he applied for political asylum.54 The Court of Appeal of Cotonou upheld the decision of Judge Houssou, but both the president of the republic and the public (p. 373) prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court. On 2 May 2014, the highest court reversed the decision of the previous courts on mere technicalities, namely that the Court of Appeal used the numbering of the relevant provisions as per the previous criminal code rather than the recently adopted code.55 In fact, it can validly be argued that the Supreme Court affirmed the pronouncements of the lower courts, as the substance of the provisions referenced in the judgments did not vary from the old code to the new one.
Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the retrial of the case by the Court of Appeal, the president decided to pardon the accused in the poisoning case, including not only the four aides and relatives prosecuted in Benin but also Talon and an alleged accomplice who had sought asylum in France. It is notable that the presidential pardon has no legal basis in the circumstances of this case where there had been no trial, no sentencing, and the persons involved were only in pre-trial detention. Following the president’s televised declaration of pardon, the public prosecutor announced that his office was going to request that the charges be dropped and the detained persons released because the presidential pardon had been granted ‘in the interest of the nation’. The accused persons were released after the pardon and before the Court of Appeal could hear the matter. The public prosecutor in acting the way he did argued that his duty was to uphold the public interest, and since the president’s pardon was granted ‘in the highest interest of the nation’, there was no longer any need to proceed with the matter before the Court of Appeal.56 It must be noted that the prosecutor in this case had first refused to transfer the file to the Supreme Court, thus prolonging the detention of the accused for four months, stating, amongst other reasons, that he was awaiting instructions from the Minister of Justice.57 On 11 August 2014, a reconstituted bench of the Court of Appeal of Cotonou corrected the material errors highlighted by the Supreme Court and merely upheld the initial appeal judgment. It is interesting to note that, on 6 November 2014, the Constitutional Court held that the Public Prosecutor of the Appeal Court of Cotonou had violated article 35 of the constitution, which requires that persons holding public offices ‘perform their duties with diligence’.58
(p. 374) A number of Francophone countries in Africa have witnessed instances of the public prosecutor obviously abusing his powers particularly when actual or potential opponents to the incumbent government are involved, as has been illustrated above. An example from Benin is illustrated by the case involving former Minister of Relations with State Institutions, Alain François Adihou, who was remanded in pre-trial detention for almost three years. As the executive and Ministère Public failed to substantiate the initial charge of contempt of parliament, he was subsequently accused of embezzlement of public funds. The investigating judge ordered his release but the prosecutor had his detention renewed beyond the legal limits as the incoming government apparently resolved to use him as a scapegoat in its purported fight against corruption.59 The minister was eventually released without trial for lack of evidence.
Such cases have also made the news in Cameroon since the inception of the Opération Epervier against corruption in 2004, as a result of which, several former and incumbent high ranking officials have been placed in pre-trial detention beyond the time prescribed by law and through the abusive and illegal acts of the prosecutor or investigating judicial officers.60 In other instances, the Ministère Public was granted full access to the file, while counsel for the accused persons were denied such access throughout the pre-trial detention. In some cases, the prosecutor brought charges after the expiry of the initial detention order, or split up the initial charges to extend the detention.61 Officials involved were mostly either former ministers who fell out with the incumbent regime after they were believed to entertain presidential ambitions or had formed dissident political parties.62
Similar trends have been seen in Côte d’Ivoire of the executive taking action against prosecutors for dissenting from or challenging the official position of the government. An illustration is the removal of the prosecutor of Abidjan for publishing an investigation report, which blamed the executive for failing to deploy enough security forces and the poor street lighting at the site of the fireworks on the 2012 Saint Sylvester’s Eve in the municipality of the Plateau. The stampede that occurred that night led to more than sixty deaths. The prosecutor’s televised statements contradicted Page Id: 374ReferencesAnti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation (Ethiopia [et]) No 236/2001, Negarit Gazeta, 24 May 2001, No 24, p.1497Prince Agbodjan, Decision No DCC 14-185, 6th November 2014, Benin; Constitutional Court(p. 375) the position taken by the Minister of Justice on the case. The government’s spokesperson had indicated that all necessary measures had been taken to prevent casualties, including deploying more security forces than needed.63 It is worth remembering that the same prosecutor was in charge of cases involving several supporters and close allies of the former president Laurent Gbagbo, including his wife in the 2010 Post Electoral Violence case; in which the prosecutor was believed to have resisted instructions from the executive.64 Importantly, a journalist who was known to be very close to the prosecutor and acted as his ‘unofficial’ communication officer, published a piece indicating that the list of pro-Gbagbo detainees freed by the prosecutor in December 2012, in the Post Electoral Violence case, was issued by the executive.65 The Abidjan prosecutor’s determination to make public the findings of his investigations, which he surely knew were contrary to the views and instructions of the government in the cases concerned, eventually resulted in his dismissal.
The various case studies presented above share the common feature of disguising an abusive use of legally granted prerogatives under technicalities in order to interfere with the independent administration of justice. For instance, the Benin public prosecutor in the Talon case made a plausible technical point that he was acting in the interest of society as a whole. However, the problem here is that the basis of this argument is the motivation of the president. But the president could not have been motivated by public interest when he was the complainant in the case. Moreover, the confusion between the ‘interest of the nation’, which is a purely political concept with no legal basis, and the public interest protected by the prosecutor, dangerously threatens the independence of the prosecutor vis-à-vis the executive. This is where the contradictory position of the public protector becomes acutely manifest. The executive generally, and the Minister of Justice in particular, are responsible for preparing and implementing penal policy. This may include deciding between prevention, punishment, conciliation, and even other sanctions of a penal, administrative, or disciplinary nature other than prosecution. We have also seen that the Minister of Justice has the right to issue instructions or recommendations to the public prosecutor as part of this duty to determine and implement penal policy. The Minister, however, may not in any way intervene in the direction of criminal proceedings nor carry out the acts of prosecution himself. However, the challenge posed by this delicate situation is to determine which instructions and advice concerning penal policy are such that the public prosecutor in the exercise of his functions has the right to accept or disregard, and which instructions and advice are issued by the Minister as the hierarchical superior of the public prosecutor making compliance legally binding. In France, (p. 376) abuse has been limited by the new laws, which require that all ministerial instructions must be in writing and included in the case file. Even if this were introduced in Francophone Africa, it is doubtful that it would limit the ability of the executive to manipulate the processes for, as noted above, the executive through the CSM not only has the ability to control public prosecutors but also to control judges. However, the links between judges and public prosecutors, to which we shall now turn, also raises its own issues.