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Part II The Relationship Between the Legislature and the Executive, 5 Legislative–Executive Relations in Presidential Democracies: The Case of Nigeria

Shikyil Sylvester

From: Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism

Edited By: Charles M. Fombad

Content type:
Book content
Product:
Oxford Constitutions of the World [OCW]
Series:
Stellenbosch Handbooks In African Constitutional Law
Published in print:
03 March 2016
ISBN:
9780198759799

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved.date: 11 December 2024

(p. 135) 5  Legislative–Executive Relations in Presidential Democracies

The Case of Nigeria

1.  Introduction

One of the salient premises on which the presidential system of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 rests is the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances amongst the three branches of government. The constitution clearly spells out how governmental powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are separated. The legislative powers of the federation are vested in the National Assembly, which comprises the Senate and the House of Representatives; and in the State House of Assembly at the state level.1 The executive powers of the federation are vested in the president while the executive powers of the states are vested in the respective governors of the states of the federation.2 Judicial powers are vested in courts established for the federation and the states.3 The essence of the separation of powers is that each branch of government, as a general rule, is prohibited from exercising the powers of the other branches of government and enables each branch to keep the powers of the other branches in balance with its own powers.4 The constitution grants the legislature the power to make laws while the executive has the power to execute and the judiciary the power to interpret the laws. The president as the head of the executive is granted a wide range of powers in the constitution but he cannot go beyond these powers as he would be checked by the legislative arm by way of impeachment.5 Although the constitution explicitly provides for separation of powers as if each branch of government remains inviolate with separate and distinct roles, the complexity of governance demands a growing interrelationship amongst the branches of government in practice. Accordingly, through checks and balances, the three arms of government can work harmoniously to ensure that no branch of government gains control over the other.

This chapter examines how the legislature and the executive interact and check each other in a manner that prevents abuses of powers. The discussion is divided into six (p. 136) sections. Section 1 is a general introduction and tries to provide the context for understanding the legislative–executive relations in Nigeria’s presidential system. This is followed by section 2 which brings into focus the constitutional role of the legislature and the executive. Section 3 examines the features of Nigeria’s presidential system. Section 4 explores the areas of interaction between the legislature and the executive in the discharge of their constitutional roles. The fifth section examines the causes of legislative–executive conflicts and their impact on good governance and the discussion ends with a conclusion in section 6.

2.  Constitutional Roles of the Legislature and Executive

Separation of powers is the basis of legislative–executive relations in Nigeria, and has remained vital in the organization of the affairs of the state. The division of powers amongst the three arms of government is, however, not absolute, as the constitution recognizes a system of checks and balances. The activities of the branches overlap in some cases and each of them connects with the others at various points. A basic structure of a democratic constitution is that state power is divided and distributed amongst the three arms of government: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. This is essential to any democratic constitution and cannot be changed or abridged while retaining the democratic nature of the constitution. It follows therefore that wherever the constitution establishes independent institutions with legislative, executive, or judicial powers, such institutions are meant to function in aid of and subordinate to the legislature, executive, and judiciary.6 In the context of Nigeria’s presidential system, the concept of separation of powers contains four basic elements:

  1. (i)  Separation of the arms of government;7

  2. (ii)  Constitutional supremacy;8

  3. (iii)  Partial independence; and

  4. (iv)  Judicial review.9

2.1  The legislature

Any discussion on the role of the legislature in a liberal democratic state needs to be placed in a proper political context. Broadly, the legislature in contemporary Nigeria operates within a presidential system. The defining political element of the presidential system in Nigeria is a system of separated arms of government sharing powers. This (p. 137) means that each of the various arms of government stands distinct and separate from the other but in terms of personnel and dominant functions none of the arms of government exercises its power to the exclusion of the other organs. Section 4 of the constitution provides the framework for the exercise of legislative powers. As a federal state, the legislative powers of the federation are vested in the National Assembly10 which consists of the Senate and House of Representatives11 while the legislative powers of the states are vested in the State Houses of Assembly.12 Both the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly are expected to make laws for peace, order, and good government in their respective spheres of legislative competence.13

There are two legislative lists in the 1999 constitution, the exclusive legislative list and the concurrent legislative list.14 As a federal state, both the federal and state legislatures are empowered to legislate on any subject matter in the concurrent legislative list. The National Assembly is responsible for making laws for the peace, order, and good government of the federation or any part of Nigeria with respect to any matter in the exclusive legislative list contained in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the constitution.15 Under this provision, the National Assembly is empowered to make laws that will regulate the sixty-six items in the Second Schedule to the constitution. In addition to these, there are two areas of implied jurisdiction provided for under paragraphs 67 and 68 of the Second Schedule.16 Furthermore, the National Assembly in conjunction with the State Houses of Assembly can make laws on any matter specified in Part II of the Second Schedule to the constitution.17

Symbolizing the equality of the constituent states, the Senate is composed of three senators from each of the thirty-six states in the federation and one from the Federal Capital Territory,18 with membership strength of 109. However, representation in the House of Representatives is based on population.19 The National Assembly has more legislative powers under the 1999 constitution than the State Houses of Assembly. That notwithstanding, two conditions must be fulfilled before a State House of Assembly can validly make any law in pursuance of its constitutional powers. First, it must ensure that the subject matter of the legislation is not included in the exclusive legislative list (p. 138) provided in section 4(7)(a) of the constitution, which is exclusively reserved for the National Assembly.20 Second, it must ensure that the subject matter of the legislation, though included in the concurrent legislative list, does not conflict with any federal legislation on the same subject matter as otherwise it would be rendered void as a result of its inconsistency with the federal law.21 In the case of Attorney-General of Ogun State v Attorney-General of the Federation,22 the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled that:

Where identical legislations (sic) on the same subject matter are passed by virtue of the constitutional powers to make laws by the National Assembly and a State House of Assembly, it would be more appropriate to invalidate the identical law passed by the State House of Assembly on the ground that the law passed by the National Assembly has covered the whole field of that subject matter.

The implication of the above ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court is that the doctrine of ‘covering the field’ applies in Nigeria. Therefore, if the provisions of a federal law on a subject intend to cover the entire field on the subject and thus provide what the law on the subject should be for the entire federation, the state law on the same subject which is inconsistent with the federal law shall, to the extent of its inconsistency, be invalid.23

The framers of the 1999 constitution, like those of the previous ones, expect the legislators to be the custodians of the people’s sovereignty. Hence, section 14(2)(a) states that sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government derives its power and authority. To give effect to this provision, the constitution places a very high premium on the question of accountability of the legislative assemblies to the people by providing for periodic elections and the recall of elected members of the legislature. However, the challenge is how to assess the effectiveness of the legislature in its provision of good governance. There is also the fundamental problem of what constitutes a good index of governance. For instance, given that the foremost role of the legislature is law-making, should the focus be on the number of bills passed or on the quality of such bills, and their relevance to the provision of good governance? Alternatively, should the focus be on the effectiveness of legislative oversight recognizing that it is within the framework of legislative oversight that the doctrine of separation of powers as well as checks and balances which are central to the principle of democracy and good governance take on greater meaning? Without question, the legislature has a critical role to play in the promotion of good governance. Consequently, the legislature is the first line of defence and safeguard against executive excesses and any descent into authoritarianism. This is very useful in the Nigerian context where executive dominance over the years has become part of the country’s chequered history of democratic experience. The diversity of the interests and constituencies represented in the legislature makes it an important structure in linking the people to the state and in the exercise of the sovereignty of the people through their elected representatives. In summary therefore, the importance of the legislature arises from the fact that its (p. 139) functions are the expressions of the will of the people. It is in the light of this that the legislature is seen globally as the symbol of power and legitimacy.24

2.2  The executive

The executive occupies a very crucial position in the governance of a state. Accordingly, the executive under the Nigerian constitution makes policies, ensures that public services strictly adhere to policies of government, as well as coordinating the activities of ministries, departments, and agencies of the state. The executive is also responsible for providing good and responsible governance for the state.25 The executive power of the federation is vested in the president while the executive power of the state is vested in the governor of a state. The presidential system practised in Nigeria has a single executive. The system precludes the concurrent vesting of executive powers in two or more persons of equal authority. The legislature cannot take away from the president or confer on others, functions of a strictly executive nature.26 Section 5(1)(b) of the constitution enumerates executive powers of the federation to include maintenance of the constitution, laws made by the National Assembly, and all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has power to make laws.27 Executive power in the context of this constitution also implies the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, supervisory powers over local government areas, power to execute laws, powers of appointment, powers as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Nigeria, power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, power to grant amnesty with the approval of the legislature, and power to enter into treaties or international conventions. Furthermore, section 5 states:

5(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of the Federation—

(a) Shall be vested in the President and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice President and Ministers of the Government of the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and

(p. 140) (b) Shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made by the National Assembly and to all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has for the time being, power to make laws.28

The executive arm is the most dynamic organ of government as it is expected to translate into concrete actions, activities, and social services on a daily basis, all the laws made by the legislature. For the executive to discharge its responsibilities effectively, it relies on the legislature to appropriate funds through budgetary provisions, approve the appointment of key political functionaries, and pass appropriate laws for the removal of any obstacle that may obstruct the smooth functioning of the executive. In this respect, the legislature and the executive are independent of each other in role specification, but cooperate and collaborate with each other in the discharge of their functions.

3.  Features of Nigeria’s Presidential System

There are some basic features that characterize or define the presidential system under the 1999 constitution, which have implications for legislature–executive relations. Nigeria’s presidential system is characterized by separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the judiciary.29 The president as the chief executive is elected in a general election directly by the electorates. Similarly, members of the legislature are elected in a general election directly.30 The president holds office for a constitutionally fixed term of four years31 and until that prescribed term ends; he or she can only be removed under the circumstances stated in section 143 of the constitution. The terms of both the legislature and the executive are fixed and are not contingent on mutual confidence.32 The chief executive has control over the cabinet as a result of his power to select his ministers who are responsible to him and not to the legislature.33 In practice, the ministers are mere advisers and subordinate to the president.34 Most important decisions can be made by him or her even against the advice of the cabinet; hence he or she has power over the cabinet.35 These basic characteristics are the salient premises upon which the presidential system in Nigeria rests. In addition, the separate origin (p. 141) and survival of the executive and the legislature means that the executive does not depend on the continued support of the legislature to stay in power.

By virtue of section 147(4) of the constitution, the same persons or bodies cannot form part of the executive and the legislature at the same time.36 The crux of this provision is that when a member of the National Assembly is appointed as a minister, he or she shall be deemed to have resigned his membership of the National Assembly and a bye election will be conducted to fill the vacancy.37 The reason is that the doubling by ministers as members of the legislature can breed conflicts of interest as experienced in the Second Republic under the parliamentary system. It can also severely undermine the ability of the legislature, especially for an emerging democracy like Nigeria after a prolonged period of military rule, to effectively perform its functions.38

There are provisions in the constitution for checks and balances to guard against misuse of power by the legislature and the executive. For instance, the president must assent to bills passed by the National Assembly for them to become Acts of the National Assembly. The National Assembly on the other hand exercises power of scrutiny over policies and decisions made by the executive. However, the control has not been effective because of certain factors which include corruption, religion, ethnicity, adverse legislative environment, inexperienced legislators coupled with the dearth of skilled legislative staff and aides, overbearing executive, and party loyalty.

4.  Legislative–Executive Interaction

The organization of modern day governments makes the overlap of roles and functions of the legislature and executive inevitable in several ways and sometimes results in a stalemate. Though there is separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, in a practical sense, the two branches watch over each other to ensure the smooth operation of government. The areas in which these arms of government provide oversight over each other in exercising their constitutional powers include: (i) the process of making laws; (ii) the powers of appointment of key political and legal functionaries; (iii) the power to declare war or an emergency situation; (iv) the power of removal of political functionaries; (v) the power to appropriate and authorize public expenditure; and (vi) the power to enforce transparency and accountability. These areas of interactions have become necessary to enable the two branches to check each other in a manner that prevents the abuse of powers. However, in practice, this is where legislative–executive conflicts originate as one branch either expands the scope of its existing powers or exercises powers that legitimately and constitutionally belong to the other branch.

(p. 142) 4.1  Power to make laws

The legislature and the executive jointly make laws in the sense that bills that eventually metamorphose into Acts of the National Assembly could be initiated by the executive39 and be acted upon by the legislature. Apart from initiating bills that are enacted into Acts by the legislature, the chief executive plays an active role in the final culmination of bills into Acts. This is done by exercising a power of veto. Section 58(1)–(5) of the constitution sets out in detail how the legislature and the executive collaborate to make a bill become an Act of the National Assembly. It provides as follows:

58 (1) The powers of the National Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by bills passed by both the Senate and House of Representatives and, except as otherwise provided by subsection (5) of this section, assented to by the President.

(2) A bill may originate in either the Senate or House of Representatives and shall not become law unless it has been passed and, except as otherwise provided by this section and section 59 of this Constitution, assented to in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(3) Where a bill has been passed by the House in which it originated, it shall be sent to the other House, and it shall be presented to the President for assent when it has been passed by that other House and agreement has been reached between the two houses on any amendment made.

(4) Where a bill is presented to the President for assent, he shall within 30 days thereof signify that he assents or that he withholds assent.

(5) Where the President withholds his assents and the bill is again passed by each House, by two-thirds majority, the bill shall become law and the assent of the President shall not be required.

In this power relation, the chief executive is given the power to heavily influence the content of law made by the legislature. The chief executive may decide to reject a bill in its entirety through the invocation of his veto power. However, if the veto power of the chief executive is exercised unrestrained, the power of the legislature could easily be eroded. In such a situation, the chief executive would control both the law-making and law execution, which is a recipe for dictatorship. To avert the possibility of dictatorship, the constitution mitigates the adverse effect of the veto power of the executive. The president or governor must indicate whether he or she assents or withholds assent within thirty days.40 Where the president or governor withholds assent and the bill is again passed by each House of the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority vote, (p. 143) the bill shall become an Act of the National Assembly and the assent of the president is not required.41 Thus the power of the legislature is checked by that of the president, but the president’s checking power is counter-checked by that of the legislature. An example of where these provisions were applied was with respect to the Niger Delta Development Commission Bill (NDDC) of March 2000. The president withheld his assent to the bill that was sent to him by the National Assembly on 3 March 2000. His objection concerned the inclusion in the bill of a provision that the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission must be confirmed by the two Houses of the National Assembly. After the expiration of the thirty days, members of the National Assembly obtained the two-thirds majority vote to override the president’s veto power and passed the Niger Delta Development Commission Act without recourse to the executive arm.

4.2  Appointment of key political and judicial functionaries

The executive branch has been empowered by the constitution to execute all laws made by the legislature. This entails the appointment of key functionaries in the ministries, departments, and agencies of government. Political appointees such as ministers, directors-general, executive secretaries of specialized agencies, and ambassadors can be made by the president. However, the appointments have to be referred to the Senate for screening and confirmation.42 The president may appoint a person to the office of Minister of the Federation subject to confirmation by the Senate.43 The appointment of key political functionaries in the executive branch of government is also a joint responsibility of the National Assembly and the executive. The same is true of the appointment of judicial officers.44 An example of this is section 231(1) and (2) of the constitution which states:

(1) The appointment of a person to the office of the Chief Justice of Nigeria shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to the confirmation of the appointment by the Senate.

(2) The appointment of a person to the office of the Justice of the Supreme Court shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation of such appointment by the Senate.

(p. 144) As part of their oversight role, section 67(2) of the constitution gives the National Assembly the powers to summon ministers, directors-general, and other chief executives of extra-ministerial agencies to appear and explain the activities of their respective agencies. On the whole the appointment of ministers and other senior state officials is made by the president in collaboration with the legislature.

4.3  Power to declare war or state of emergency

The president is the chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the Nigerian armed forces.45 He is, by virtue of these powers, authorized to deploy the armed forces to defend the country against external aggression. In exercising this power, the president is limited by the constitutional provision that requires the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives sitting in a joint session. For example, section 5(4)(a) of the constitution states that the president shall not declare a state of war between the federation and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the National Assembly sitting in a joint session. Similarly, the president cannot deploy members of the armed forces on combat duty outside Nigeria without prior approval of the Senate.46 However, in exceptional cases and in emergency, the president may deploy the armed forces and seek concurrence retroactively. In this regard, section 5(5) of the constitution states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the President in Consultation with the National Defence Council, may deploy members of the Armed forces of the Federation on a limited combat duty outside Nigeria, if he is satisfied that the national security is under imminent threat or danger; provided that the President within seven days of actual combat engagement, seek the consent of the Senate and the Senate shall thereafter give or refuse the said consent within fourteen days.

Further, section 305 of the constitution allows for a proclamation of a state of emergency by the president in the following circumstances: (i) if the Federation is at war; or (ii) in imminent danger of invasion; or (iii) there is actual break-down of law and order and public safety in the Federation or any part of the country to such an extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security; or (iv) there is a clear and present danger of an actual break-down of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part of the country; or (v) there is an occurrence or imminent danger or the occurrence of any disaster or calamity in any part of the Federation; and (vi) when the president receives a request to do so in accordance with the provisions of section 305(4) of the constitution. Such a proclamation must be endorsed by the National Assembly within two days if the National Assembly is in session or within ten days if it is on recess.47 The provisions of sections 5(5) and 305 of the constitution clearly show that the powers to deploy the Nigerian armed forces for the purpose of (p. 145) prosecuting war or to declare a state of emergency are exercised concurrently between the legislature and the executive.

4.4  Powers to appropriate and authorize public expenditure

The relationship between the legislature and the executive in public finance remains a controversial topic. First, public choice theorists tend to portray the legislature as selfish politicians, who are likely to help themselves to public resources either to pursue their individual, constituency, or party interests.48 On the other hand, the parliamentarians argue that the executive, largely made up of non-elected members, cannot claim to understand the needs of the people better. This is predicated on the assumption that parliament is largely made up of elected representatives who understand the needs of the people. The constitution laid down the legal framework for democratic governance based on a presidential system by establishing a bicameral legislature at the federal level while at the state level, it established a unicameral legislature. Since the re-emergence of democracy on 29 May 1999, the country has witnessed several conflicts between the legislature and executive over the budgetary processes at all levels of government.

Law, order, and good governance can only be effectively provided to the citizens when there are adequate financial resources. The power of appropriation and authorization of public funds is conferred on the legislature but with the active participation of the executive arm of government. It is therefore no surprise that one of the areas where the legislature and the executive interact most actively is in respect of the budget process. In this respect, sections 80(2), (3), and (4), 81(1), and 83(1) of the constitution state:

…

80(2) No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the fund by this Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act, or and Act passed in pursuance of section 81 of this Constitution.

(3) No money shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the Federation, other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorized by the National Assembly.

(4) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly.

81(1) The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimate of the revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the next following financial year.

…

(p. 146) 83(1) The National Assembly may by law make provisions for the establishment of a Contingency Fund for the Federation and for authorising the President, if satisfied that there has arisen an urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other provision exists, to make advances from the Fund to meet the need.

At the federal level, the National Assembly authorizes expenditure through the passage of the Appropriation Bill and this is assented to by the president.49 Moreover, the content of the Appropriation Bill is by and large defined by the executive, since it normally emanates as an executive bill submitted to the National Assembly for deliberations and approval.50 In its deliberations, the National Assembly maintains close contact with the executive during the budget defence sessions and may request such clarification or information as may be necessary to guide it in the discharge of its functions. Generally the powers conferred on the National Assembly under section 88(1)(a) and (b) of the constitution enable it to make laws or to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the execution or administration of laws; or in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by the National Assembly.51 In essence, the legislature and the executive play active and complementary roles in the budget process.52

4.5  Enforcement of transparency and accountability

Corruption has become an endemic problem in Nigeria with grave consequences on the polity. In the illuminating words of renowned jurist and former chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, the Honourable Justice Mustapha Akanbi, the effect of corruption on the foundation of the Nigerian society has been most harrowing and disconcerting. He described the situation as follows:

Corruption is indeed the bane of our society. It has been the harbinger of the messy situation in which we find ourselves today. Our economy has been ruined. Our hopes for a greater tomorrow have been dashed. Our value system is destroyed. Nigeria which was once the pride of the black race sank into the nadir of degradation. The devastating effect of the colossal corruption into which the country was plunged destroyed our economy and created an unstable political environment which unfortunately made us cut a sorry picture in the eyes of the international community. As we went down sliding, there was hardly any probity, accountability and transparency … Respect for the rule of law and order was relegated to the background. Inefficiency, incompetence, mediocrity, dishonesty, commonalty and all sorts of vices, which are all by-product of corruption ruled the waves.

(p. 147) The legislature and the executive are constitutionally mandated to try as much as possible to eliminate all corrupt practices and abuse of power.53 It is in furtherance of this duty that the legislature enacted the Corrupt Practices (And Other Related Offences) Act, 2000, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007 and the Public Procurement Act, 2007. The executive has the responsibility of executing projects and ensuring the day-to-day delivery of social services. The executive is therefore accountable for the performance of the government in this regard. The legislature through its oversight monitors, evaluates, and imposes sanctions on the executive where necessary. Through the committees of the two Houses of the National Assembly, the legislature can keep close check on the activities of ministries, departments, and agencies.

In general, the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly have not been very effective in carrying out their many responsibilities of oversight over the executive. This is generally believed to be the result of the long period of military rule which deprived the nation of the services of a legislature and the experience that goes with this. As Hamalai notes, the broad political challenges in legislative–executive relations involve the subordination of the legislature to the executive in Africa’s imperial presidential systems and some formal constitutional constraints on legislative oversight powers.54 In the Nigerian presidential system, the State Houses of Assembly have become mere appendages and instruments of the political executives.

5.  Causes of Legislative–Executive Conflicts

Given the emergence of many mixed-regime types, the debate over which specific institutional arrangement best promotes political stability could be cast in terms of the dispersion of power and authority amongst all national institutions.55 In the tradition of Madison, it can be argued that diffusing power across institutions contributes to the stability and survivability of democratic systems by making it difficult for any one branch of government, and therefore any one political group, to centralize power.56 Thus, legislative–executive conflict in Nigeria often originates in disagreements between the two branches over policy issues or as a result of personal conflicts between prominent politicians in each branch. In many cases, personal conflicts reinforce policy conflicts.

Constructive relationships between the legislature and the executive are essential for good governance, effective maintenance of the constitution, and the rule of law.57 (p. 148) However, the relationship according to Lijphart is inherently a power relationship and a power struggle.58 Bernick and Bernick, while considering the model of a balance of power relation between the legislature and the executive in a presidential system, summarized the relationship into three power configurations: the governor is dominant, the legislature is dominant, and the two are competitively structured.59

5.1  Unhealthy rivalry following from legislative oversight

One of the reasons that the presidential system was adopted in Nigeria was to avoid the clashes of interests, conflict of authority, complexities, and uncertainties in governmental relations and the weakening of leadership by collective power and responsibility which were inherent in the parliamentary system adopted at independence.60 In exercising oversight, mutual suspicion between the legislature and the executive has remained one of the most important challenges since the return to constitutional governance in 1999. It is a challenge that is rooted in the culture of executive dominance and the relative weakness of the legislature in Nigeria’s post-independence political history. Under Nigeria’s presidential system, the legislature as an institution is engaged in overseeing, supervising, or controlling ministries, departments, and agencies.61 Oversight supervision and control denote distinct degrees of legislative influence on the executive. For instance, when the legislature by contact, observation, or investigation places itself in the position of a watchdog over executive activities, the legislative–executive relationship is defined in terms of oversight. When the influence of the legislature constitutes substantial involvement in the formulation or implementation of executive policy, producing change in policy emphasis or priority, the legislative–executive relationship is defined in terms of supervision. When the legislature directs executive establishment and policy or requires legislative clearance for executive decisions, the relationship is defined in terms of control. These varied relationships between the legislature and the executive provide mechanisms by which the legislature can test and secure executive compliance with legislative policy as well as hold the executive accountable. Also, legislative investigations, review, and even involvement in executive policy-making provide the legislature with the mechanisms for evaluation and assessment of executive policy, exposing gaps between expected and actual performance and providing legislators with clues as to what changes to the law are needed. Above all, legislative oversight, supervision, and control provide relationships that should ordinarily facilitate reciprocal and sustained support for public policy between the legislature and the executive.

(p. 149) However, sixteen years of democratic governance have yet to eliminate the mutual suspicion and distrust, acrimony, intimidation, political rivalry, unnecessary bickering, blackmail, and muscle-flexing62 between the legislature and executive, who have the responsibility to ensure delivery of democracy dividends to Nigerians. At the centre of the friction is the exercise of oversight, which is a constitutional mechanism for checks and balances, coupled with the annual budget-making exercise and its implementation. The law-makers have continued to bicker over the poor implementation of Appropriation Acts. Further, the tendency by both of the arms of government to usurp each other’s power or meddle in the affairs of the other continues unabated. The operatives of the executive arm in the ministries, departments, and agencies still conduct their affairs as if Nigeria remains under military rule where the input of the legislature is inconsequential. The executive arm perceives the essence of legislative oversight as the pursuit of parochial interests and self-aggrandisement by the members of the legislature, while the members of the legislature on the other side feel that those who do not want them to exercise their power of oversight are corrupt.

5.2  Non-adherence to due process in the conduct of government business

The rule of law is the pillar on which civilized societies are founded. The legislature and the executive must exercise their authority by way of law and be subject to legal restraints. Most of the conflicts between the legislature and the executive have their roots in the non-adherence to the rule of law and due process in the exercise of constitutional powers.63

The Supreme Court of Nigeria has deprecated the behaviour of the legislature and the executive caused by the lack of respect for the rule of law in the conduct of government business in Attorney-General, Lagos State v Attorney-General of the Federation,64 when the Court said:

In a society where the rule of law prevails, self-help is not available to the executive or any arm of government. In view of the fact that such a conduct could breed anarchy and totalitarianism, and since anarchy and totalitarianism are antithesis to democracy, courts operating the rule of law, the life-blood of democracy, are under constitutional duty to stand against such action. The courts are available to accommodate all sorts of grievances that are justifiable in law and section 6 of the Constitution gives the courts power to adjudicate on matters between two or more competing parties. In our (p. 150) democracy, all the governments of this country as well as organisations and individuals must bow to due process of law and this they can vindicate by resorting to the courts for redress in the event of any grievance. In the military Governor of Lagos State v Chief Ojukwu (1980) NWLR (PT 18), the court condemned self-help on the part of the Military Governor of Lagos State. The court held that it was not for the Governor to take a unilateral action against the respondent in respect of his father’s property when the matter was pending in the court. The court held that no one (including Governors) is entitled to take the law into his own hand[s]. If this court went the whole hog of protecting the rule of law in a military regime which is a dictatorship, there cannot be any valid or justifiable reason to take a less position in civilian regime where access to court is a desideratum.

Without the rule of law and due process as limits on the exercise of legislative and executive powers, popular will can easily be corrupted by passions, emotions, sentiments, and short-term irrationalities. Against this background therefore, the legislature and the executive must follow legal procedures that are prefixed in the exercise of their constitutional powers. In this way, constitutionalism and democratic values can be entrenched.

5.3  Entrenched military culture

A stabilized democratic political system exists only where there is democratic tradition. Democratic tradition on the other hand entails a high level of development of political culture and effective institutionalization of its components. Thus, when democratic values and processes are institutionalized within a political system, such a system is classified as having a developed culture and democratic tradition. In this regard, Almond and Verba argue that a political culture of a country refers to the political system internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its populations.65 A military regime by its nature is elitist, restrictive, and authoritarian.66 In Nigeria, the military regimes in their various forms claimed to be concerned with the Nigerian geo-political and cultural entity. This was evident in their emphasis on structural engineering and institution creation and building. However, they showed little or no concern for issues of constitutionalism and democracy. Public policies were invariably less concerned about the question of human rights, rule of law, transparency and accountability, freedom, justice, and the dignity of the people. Therefore, government action was often oriented towards the accomplishment of policies regardless of how the policies afflicted the rights and welfare of the people. For instance, during the first military regime, the government enacted the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No 3 of 1966. The Decree was considered draconian for its provisions which, amongst other things, ousted the jurisdiction of courts from entertaining anything done under the Decree. For example, it provided for the arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals for six months without trial.

(p. 151) The lack of institutionalization of political organizations and procedure during the military regimes in Nigeria led to institutional fragility, systemic flaws, and a low level of political culture. Also, the absence of effective institutional checks and limitations on the exercise of executive powers during the military regimes, as well as the ‘carry-over’ of retired military personnel into the legislature and the executive, have grave implications for legislative–executive relationships in the conduct of government business. This was evident from the resort to undemocratic practices in the operation of the constitution, especially during the presidency of General Olusegun Obasanjo (Rtd). The conflict between the National Assembly and the executive reached its highest point in 2001 following the State of the Nation debate conducted by the House of Representatives during which allegations of highhandedness, dictatorial tendencies, failure to grapple with economic and social problems, lack of political will to tackle corruption, non-implementation of budgets, and gross violations of the constitution were levelled against the president.67 At the state level, the governors of Oyo State, Plateau State, Ekiti State, Bayelsa State, and Anambra were removed from office by their State Houses of Assembly for gross misconduct arising from financial misappropriation and violation of section 188(2)(a) of the constitution. However, the Supreme Court68 and the Court of Appeal reversed the decisions because the State Houses of Assembly had not complied with the procedure for removing a governor laid out in the constitution.69 Thus, in spite of sixteen years of democratization, the military culture of impunity and flagrant disregard of the rule of law and due process in governance has remained one of the key triggers of conflict between the legislature and executive in Nigeria at the federal and state levels of governance.

(p. 152) 5.4  High-handedness of the executive over the legislature

The executive in the presidential system tends to monopolize power and discretionary authority not only in Nigeria but in presidential regimes across the world.70 In the case of Nigeria, the unified nature of the executive, coupled with its power to initiate and enact laws, and its control over the administration of the country, places tremendous power and discretion at the disposal of the executive.71 In fact, executive dominance of the legislature is related to Nigeria’s colonial and post-colonial history and the continued strengthening of the executive branch because of the disruption of the constitutional framework of governance occasioned by the long history of military rule. The Nigerian legislature developed as an appendage and necessary extension of the colonial state which was brought into existence not to perform legislative functions as the most important institution of liberal democratic state, but to ratify executive directives issued by the colonial governor. The colonial legislatures had no independence in the discharge of their legislative functions as their role was merely ratificatory. In contrast to their predecessors, they were merely designed to complement the work of the colonial governments by serving as agencies for articulation of views and ventilation of popular feelings that were not expected to radically change the patterns and policies of the colonial governments.72 This orientation has continued to impact the performance of the legislature, not only during the colonial era but even after independence.

To manage the tension and conflicts in legislative–executive relations, a department in the presidency headed by a special adviser and supported by four special assistants was created. The creation of the department epitomizes, in action and spirit, the deliberate and conscious effort being made to ensure harmonious relationship between the legislature and the executive. The department carries out advisory, administrative, monitoring, supportive, and defensive functions on behalf of the president at the National Assembly. The special adviser and the special assistants constitute the eyes and ears of the president of the Federation in the National Assembly to ensure that the requests emanating from the president are properly presented and approved, while his actions are satisfactorily defended and justified.

Clearly, the 1999 constitution explicitly states that the legislature and the executive have a constitutional responsibility to provide good governance73 but the quest for good governance in the country has continued to be unsuccessful because of the persistent tensions between the legislative and executive branches. As noted by Nwabueze, decision-making in any presidential democracy is designed to be a joint effort of the legislature and the executive.74 While policy decisions are in most cases initiated in (p. 153) the form of bills by the executive, the legislature, as the peoples’ representative, debates and approves such initiatives and through that process, brings the interests of the people to bear on the decisions and policies of government. Therefore, the legislature and the executive must see themselves as partners in progress and the separation of powers should not mean or be seen as separation of government.

6.  Conclusion

The relationship that exists between the legislature and the executive is crucial for facilitating good governance in any democratic system. This makes cooperation preferable to conflict in legislature–executive relation. As Remington75 observes, for legislators to be able to fulfil their roles of representation, oversight, and law-making, there has to be a certain degree of cooperation between the legislature and the executive in policy-making. The legislature must have the capacity to monitor the executive, and the executive needs to be willing to comply with the legislative enactments. The realization of democratic governance in Nigeria is determined by the extent to which the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly independently and vibrantly perform their pivotal roles as citizens’ representative through legislation and oversight. The health of any democracy declines when there is no level playing field and the capacity for the legislature to effectively influence policy and oversee the executive is weak. The presidential system ushered in by the 1999 constitution in Nigeria has not led to democratic order and political stability. This does not seem to be attributable to problems with the institutional design, but rather, a legacy of military dictatorship. This may be considered inevitable when it is noted that since the return to civilian rule in 1999, two of the four democratically elected presidents have been former military heads of state. Thus, the consolidation and sustenance of Nigeria’s nascent democracy depends to a great extent on how the legislature could assume its constitutional role as an important check on executive excesses. It will also depend on the willingness of the executive to operate within its constitutional limits.

Nigeria is a complex country with diverse interests and problems. The constitution makes ample provision for a clear separation of power between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The constitution also provides for checks and balances to guide the relationship between the three organs of government. However, owing to the military culture that existed between 1966 and 1999, democratic principles have not been fully embraced. Although the 2015 elections have brought another former military ruler to power, there are hopes that there will be a change of attitude because those elections also marked the first time that an incumbent government was defeated at the ballot box. It is to be hoped that the voice of the people will now be heard and reflected in government policies and in the way the three branches of government operate, today more than before.

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Footnotes:

1  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 4.

2  ibid s 5.

3  ibid s 6.

4  Solomon Akinboye and Remi Anifowose, ‘Nigerian Government and Politics’ in Remi Anifowose and Francis Enemuo (eds), Elements of Politics (Malthouse 1999).

5  The president or vice-president may be removed from office by the National Assembly for gross misconduct in line with provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 143(1)(2)(b).

6  See for instance, constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 153. The section provides that there shall be established for the Federation the following bodies, namely: Code of Conduct Bureau; Council of State; Federal Character Commission; Federal Civil Service Commission; Federal Judicial Service Commission; Independent National Electoral Commission; National Defence Council; National Economic Council; National Judicial Council; National Population Commission; National Security Council; Nigeria Police Council; Police Service Commission; and Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.

7  Rahila Ashirumun Ahmadu and Niyi Ajiboye (eds), A Hand Book on Legislative Practice and Procedure of the National Assembly (National Secretariat of Nigerian Legislatures 2004) 30.

8  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 1(1)(3).

9  ibid s 4(8) provides that the exercise of legislative powers shall be subject to judicial review by courts of law and of judicial tribunals established by law.

10  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 4(1) states that ‘the legislative powers of the federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the federation which shall consist of a Senate and a house of representatives’.

11  ibid s 43.

12  ibid s 4(6) provides that ‘the legislative powers of a State of the Federation shall be vested in a House of Assembly of the State’.

13  ibid s 4(2) and (7).

14  Specifically, ibid s 4(1) states that legislative powers of the federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the federation which shall consist of a Senate and a house of representatives. Section 4(2) states that ‘the National Assembly shall have power to make laws for peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the second Schedule to this Constitution.’

15  There are sixty-eight items in the exclusive list as contained in Part I of the Second Schedule to the constitution.

16  Abia State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2006) 16 NWLR (PT 1005) 265 (SC) 352.

17  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 4(6) and (7).

18  ibid s 48.

19  This is in line with s 49 of the constitution. The House of Representatives has membership strength of 360.

20  Abia State (n 16).

21  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 4(5).

22  (1982) 3 NCLR 166 (SC).

23  INEC v Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 114 (SC) 116.

24  Ralph A Rossum and G Alan Tarr, American Constitutional Law: The Structure of Government (6th edn, Wadsworth/Thomson learning 2002) 315.

25  TA Puka, Substance of Government (JHL Printing and Publications 2007) 58.

26  AG Federation & Ors v Abubakar & Ors (2007) 10 NWLR (PT 1041) 53 (SC) 54.

27  The Supreme Court of India, while interpreting art 53 of the Indian constitution which is similar to s 5(1)(a) of the 1999 constitution, defined executive power in the case of Samsher Singh v State of Punjab as what remains after the legislative and judicial powers are separated and removed. The Supreme Court of India in the case adopted the ‘residuary test’ in defining executive power. However, one of the best interpretations of executive power was provided by Justice PB Mukharji. According to him ‘[E]xecutive power can never be constitutionally defined and all constitutional efforts to define it must necessarily fail. Executive power is an undefinable multi-dimensional constitutional concept varying from time to time, from situation to situation and with the changing concepts of state in political philosophy and political science … Executive power is nothing short of ‘the whole state in action’ in its manifold activities. In one sense, the legislative power and judicial power, in order to graduate from phrases to facts, have finally to culminate in executive power to become effective.’

28  The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 5(2) on the other hand provides that ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of a State shall be vested in the Governor of that State and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by a House of Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Deputy Governor and Commissioners of the Government of the State or officers in the public service of the State; and shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made by the House of Assembly of the State and to all matters with respect to which the House of Assembly has for the time being power to make laws’.

29  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, ss 4, 5, and 6 provide the framework. See also Ben Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa vol 4 (Spectrum Books Limited 2004) 76.

30  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 132(1).

31  ibid s 135(2).

32  ibid ss 64(1) and 135(2), which state the tenures of the legislature and the president respectively.

33  SA Idahosa and Wesley Ekpekurede, ‘Ideas And Forms of Organization of Government’ in Augustine Ovuoronye Ikelegbe (ed), Politics and Government: An Introductory and Comparative Perspective (Uri Publishing Ltd 1995) 317.

34  Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarianism and Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007) 92.

35  Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press 1999) 58.

36  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 68(1)(d) and (e).

37  ibid s 147(4) states that where a member of the National Assembly or of a House of Assembly is appointed as a minister of the government of the Federation, he shall be deemed to have resigned his membership of the National Assembly or of the House of Assembly on his taking the oath of office as minister.

38  ibid s 147(4) is similar in context and intendment to art 1 s 6(2) of the US constitution which prevents members of the Congress from serving as officers of the government in the executive branch.

39  In the context of the Nigerian legislative process, a bill can emanate from the president, the judiciary, or a member of the Senate or House of Representatives. For instance, the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, Order XII Rule 2(1)(a) and (b) state that all bills emanating from the president shall be forwarded to the Speaker under covering letter personally signed by the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria while all bills emanating from the judiciary shall be forwarded to the Speaker under covering letter personally signed by the Chief Justice of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Bills from the Senate and members of the House of Representatives shall also be forwarded to the Speaker. See also Ra’uf Ayo Dunmoye et al (eds), The National Assembly: Pillar of Democracy (National Secretariat of Nigerian Legislatures 2007) 209.

40  Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 58(4).

41  ibid s 58(5).

42  See ibid s 154(1) in respect of the appointment of chairman and members of certain federal executive bodies.

43  ibid s 147(2).

44  ibid s 318 defines a judicial officer in the context of the Nigerian legal system to mean the office of the Chief Justice of Nigeria, or Justice of the Supreme Court, the President or Justice of the Court of Appeal, the office of the Chief Judge or Judge of the Federal High Court, the office of the Chief Judge or Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, the office of the Chief Judge of the High Court of a State and Judge of a High Court of a State, a Grand Khadi or Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital territory Abuja, a Grand Khadi or Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, a President or Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a President or Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of a State, and a reference to a judicial officer is a reference to the holder of such office.

45  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 218(1).

46  This is in line with the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 5(4)(b).

47  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 305(6)(b).

48  SC Rapu, Legislative–Executive Relations and the Budgetary Process in Nigeria: An Evaluation of the 1999 Constitution (Central Bank of Nigeria 2003) 3.

49  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 80(2).

50  ibid s 81(1).

51  ibid s 88(2).

52  In practice, the sources of acrimony between the legislature and the executive have been the late submission of the draft budget which always leads to late approval of the budget; the unilateral amendment of the outcomes of the draft budget by the legislature; the budget of the legislature; the use of parliamentary oversight; lack of proper information flow from the Accountant-General during the budget implementation stage; delay in the auditing and submission of the report to the legislature; poor implementation of the budgetary provisions; and the perception of the executive over audit queries as an unnecessary attack on the government and the constitution which fails to specify a time frame within which the Accountant-General must report the financial statements to the Auditor-General and the general public.

53  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 15(5).

54  Ladi Hamalai, ‘Legislative Oversight of the Executive’ in Ladi Hamalai and Rotimi Suberu (eds), The National Assembly and Democratic Governance in Nigeria (National Institute for Legislative Studies 2014) 253.

55  Kent Eaton, ‘Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena’ (2000) 32 Comparative Politics 355.

56  Charles R Wise and Trevor L Brown, ‘The Separation of powers in Ukraine’ (1999) 32 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 23.

57  House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Relations between the executive, the Judiciary and Parliament’ (6th Report of Session, House of Lords, London, 26 July 2007, The Stationery Office Limited) 57.

58  Lijphart (n 35) 64.

59  Ethan M Bernick and Lee E Bernick, ‘Executive–Legislative Relations: Where You Sit Really Does Matter’ (2008) 89 Social Science Quarterly 142.

60  Ben Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nigeria (Longman 1982) 256.

61  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 88(1). The right to check abuse of power, mismanagement of funds, waste of national resources, non-application of appropriated funds to the right purpose, or application of non-appropriated funds is a very important function of the legislature under the constitution.

62  Emmanual Remi Aiyede, ‘Executive–Legislative Relations in Nigeria’s Emerging Presidential Democracy’ (2005) 2 Unilag Journal of Politics 65.

63  Late President Musa Yar’Adua once decried the situation when he said that ‘as a nation, one of our greatest challenges has been the evolvement of a culture of disrespect for the rule of law, unbridled corruption, endemic crime, violence, infrastructural deficit and a general malaise in the polity. All these constituted a direct manifestation of disrespect for law and order. This background has informed our administration’s total and absolute commitment to entrenching an enduring culture of unqualified respect for the rule of law and constitutionality in the conduct of all government business. Persistent peace, stability and progress cannot abide in a system that is not rooted in equity, justice, the rule of law and the fear of God.’

64  (2004) 18 NWLR (PT 904) 127 (SC).

65  Almond Gabriel and Verba Sidney, The Civil Culture (Little Brown and Company 1963) 12.

66  Geriant Parry, Political Elites (George Allen and Unwin Ltd 1969) 157.

67  The House compiled a total of seventeen allegations of constitutional breaches against the president. Most of the allegations centred around unauthorized spending and outright violations of the Revenue Allocation Act which amongst others include: issuance of a presidential order purportedly amending the Revenue Allocation Act, contrary to ss 161(1), (2), and 313 of the 1999 constitution; engaging in extra budgetary spending including N60 billion on the national stadium, Abuja; payment of N12 billion to Julius Berger plc and the purchase of sixty-three houses for ministers to the tune of N3 billion in violation of s 80 (2), (3), and (4) of the 1999 constitution; deployment of troops to Odi in Bayelsa State and Zaki Biam in Benue State resulting in the murder of innocent citizens and massive destruction of property without lawful authority in clear violation of s 217 of the 1999 constitution; refusal to fully implement successive budgets as they affected the salaries of staff and overhead costs of ministries contrary to the provisions of the Appropriation Act, 2002; unilateral decision to make across the board cuts of 50% of overhead costs contained in the 2002 Appropriation Act, without the approval of the National Assembly; unilateral decision to merge the Federal Road Safety Commission and the Nigeria Police Force without a bill for an Act to harmonize the two bodies or repeal the Federal Road Safety Commission Act; merging, without enabling legislation, the National Bank for Commerce and Industry, the National Economic Reconstruction Fund, and the Nigerian Industrial Bank to form the Bank of Industry while the laws establishing each of these institutions were still valid and subsisting; and the appointment without consultation with the Police Council, an Inspector General of Police, contrary to the 1999 constitution and extending the appointment of the Acting Auditor-General of the Federation beyond six months without a resolution of the Senate, contrary to s 86(1) of the 1999 constitution.

68  The Supreme Court set aside the removal of the governors in the following cases: Alamieyeseigha v Igoniwari (No 2) [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt 1034) 524 (SC); Dapianlong v Dariye (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt 1038) 332 (SC); Balonwu v Peter Obi (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt 1028) 488 (SC); Inakoju v Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1025) 423 (SC); Okoli v Udeh (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt 1095) 213 (SC).

69  The procedure for removal of a governor or deputy governor is provided in s 188 of the constitution.

70  Aiyede (n 62) 73.

71  Stephen Akinyemi Lafenwa, ‘The Legislature and the Challenge of Democratic Governance in Africa: The Nigerian Case’ (Seminar paper delivered at a conference on Governance and Development on Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and Future Prospects, University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 4‒5 December 2009).

72  Mojeedv Olujinmi Alabi and Joseph Yinka Fasagba, ‘The Legislature and Anti-Corruption Crusade under the Fourth Republic of Nigeria: Constitutional Imperatives and Practical Realities’ (2010) 1 IJPGG 1, 2.

73  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, ss 4(2) and 14(2)(b).

74  Ben Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (Nwamife Publishers 1982) 166.

75  Thomas Remington, ‘Separation of Powers and Legislative Oversight in Russia’ (Legislatures and Oversight, WBI Working Paper Series, World Bank Institute 2004) 43.