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Indonesia: Legal Response to Covid-19

Indonesia [id]

Linda Yanti Sulistiawati, Ibrahim Hanif

From: Oxford Constitutions (http://oxcon.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.date: 18 May 2022

General editors: Prof. Jeff King; Prof. Octavio Ferraz
Area editors: Prof. Tendayi Achiume; Prof. Alan Bogg; Dr. Natalie Byrom; Prof. Cathryn Costello; Prof. Nicola Countouris; Prof. Colleen Flood; Prof. Eva Pils; Prof. Nico Steytler; Dr. Silvia Suteu; Dr. Bryan Thomas; Dr. Michael Veale; Dr. Pedro A. Villarreal

© The several contributors 2021. Some rights reserved. This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0), a copy of which is available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/. Enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence terms should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press.

Preferred Citation: L Y Sulistiawati, I Hanif, ‘Indonesia: Legal Response to Covid-19’, in Jeff King and Octávio LM Ferraz et al (eds), The Oxford Compendium of National Legal Responses to Covid-19 (OUP 2021). doi: 10.1093/law-occ19/e36.013.36

Except where the text indicates the contrary, the law is as it stood on: 28 September 2021

As of 28 September 2021, the World Health Organization has reported 4,209,403 confirmed cases of Covid-19, with 141,585 deaths. As of 21 September 2021, 127,209,288 vaccine doses have been administered in Indonesia,1 a country with a 2020 population estimate of 273,523,615. Indonesia confirmed its first Covid-19 case on 2 March 2020, after which the virus spread rapidly, overwhelming the healthcare system, and requiring nationwide restrictions which began in early April 2020 and were extended up until April 2021. A second wave began in June 2021, following the relaxation of restrictions and the spread of the Delta variant, which also overwhelmed the healthcare system and led to renewed restrictions until mid-September 2021.

I.  Constitutional Framework

1.  Indonesia is a presidential unitary republic based on the 1945 Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar 1945). Indonesia’s legal system is derived from the Dutch system and follows the French and German model of civil law.2

2.  The current prevailing 1945 Constitution has been amended four times: in October 1999, August 2000, November 2001, and August 2002. These amendments, among others, deal with far-reaching issues such as limitations on the powers and terms of office of the President; decentralization of authority from the central Government to provincial and regional governments; and the creation of additional constitutional bodies such as the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) and the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi).

3.  The Constitution also provides for a number of constitutional bodies. Two of the most important are the General Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) and the House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR). The DPR’s function is to make legislation and hold the President and his ministers accountable, while the MPR is the only supreme State body that has the power to amend the Constitution, aside from drafting strategic plans for the country.

4.  The Government is the head of the executive branch, organized in a hierarchical structure. As a rule, the Government, acting through its ministers operating within the sphere of their respective ministries, can issue binding instructions to lower-level administrative bodies unless prohibited by law. There are two classifications of governmental agencies or governmental institutions, namely (1) based on the source of the authority of the institutions; and (2) the functional role of the institutions.3

5.  Based on the newest amendment of the 1945 Constitution, there are 34 State institutions, 28 of which are mentioned in the Constitution.4 In principle, there are eight ‘State High-Institutions’ which means that their authorities are explained in detail in the Constitution. They are: the President and Vice-President; the DPR; the DPD; the MPR; the Constitutional Court (CC); the Supreme Court (SC); and the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK). The rest of the institutions or agencies are grouped as Lembaga Pemerintahan (governmental institutions) and Lembaga Pemerintah Non-Departemen (non-department governmental institutions).

6.  Ministries are parts of governmental institutions. The terms agency and institution are interchangeably used in Indonesia. The National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), for example, is called an ‘agency’ although it is a ministerial department working directly under the President.

7.  The overall hierarchy of laws in Indonesia starts from the 1945 Constitution, the MPR decrees (Tap MPR) made by the MPR, the laws (Undang-Undang) enacted by the DPR, or the interim emergency regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang) made by the Presidency, the governmental regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah), the presidential regulations (Peraturan Presiden), the provincial regulations (Peraturan Daerah) made by provincial parliaments, and the governor (province), regent (regency under province), or mayoral (city) regulations.5 Regulations made by other Government institutions such as ministries or task forces will derive their legal power based on one of these norms or authorities given therein.6

8.  In addition to the national political and administrative level, there are also administrative bodies and representative assemblies at regional level in the 34 provinces (provinsi) and at the local level in each of the 548 regencies and cities (kabupaten and kota). Local self-government is guaranteed by Article 18(7) of the 1945 Constitution and the Local Government Law No 23 of 2014;7 known as regional autonomy, it was among the many areas of reform following the 1998 revolution which sought to curtail the powers of the central Government. The response to the pandemic is based on the Contagious Diseases Law8 and the Health Quarantine Law,9 as explained in Part II.B below.

9.  The response to the pandemic has not changed the basic constitutional structure of the State. However, certain measures have created tensions in the division of powers between the executive and the legislative branches, detailed in Parts II.B, II.C, and III.A respectively, as well as between national and local authorities, detailed in Part IV.A.1. The national government has used existing statutes to reduce the influence of parliament over regulations enacted by the executive (detailed further in Parts II.B, II.C, and III.A below). Meanwhile, decentralisation of pandemic health powers, where regions were able to to plan for and manage their own responses, described as vague,10 has often led to a lack of coordination between different levels of government (see Part IV.A.1 below).

II.  Applicable Legal Framework

A.  Constitutional and international law

10.  On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the Covid-19 status from an epidemic to a pandemic. This means that the contagion of the disease (its spread from one human to another) is high, with a high fatality rate, and that there is no effective medical treatment for this widespread disease.11 Indonesia announced ‘patient 1’ of Covid-19 on 2 March 2020, and in terms of legal preparedness, Indonesia was already equipped with the necessary legal basis.

11.  Under Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution, the President has powers to declare emergency situations (see Parts II.B and II.C below).12 This power was not invoked, and he instead opted to declare a health emergency through a lower law, which did not theoretically allow him to suspend constitutional protections. As no such explicit suspensions of constitutional protections were declared, disruptions to rights are discussed in subsequent sections (see Parts III.C and III.D below)—briefly, Courts saw reduced service and sped up planned digitization of proceedings, while elections were delayed but otherwise held.

12.  Indonesia’s legal approach to the Covid-19 pandemic has been inward-looking, rarely explicitly relying on international conventions or WHO norms—save those under its reporting obligations under the WHO—to promulgate new legal norms. The main laws and Government regulations used to combat Covid-19 make no mention of international conventions. WHO standards and practices are however used in ministerial regulations with regards to aspects such as vaccinations,13 as well as technical Government health guidances.14

B.  Statutory provisions

13.  Four laws could have been invoked to declare an exceptional situation in response to Covid-19, those being the 1957 Emergency Situation Law, 1984 Contagious Disease Law, 2007 Disaster Management Law, and 2018 Health Quarantine Law.15

14.  The Government of Indonesia opted not to use the Emergency Situation Law and chose the Contagious Diseases Law and the Health Quarantine Law instead. In using the already established laws, the President and his aides are free to use their executive power to enact regulations under these laws to handle matters during the pandemic. Parliamentary approval is not needed to enact executive level regulations. There was little in the way of discourse due to people were grappling with the consequences of the pandemic.

15.  A public health emergency was not declared at the national level, but the Contagious Diseases Law highlights the requirements to establish perimeter areas of contagion, and management efforts. A contagion area and the termination of the contagion area status are decided by the Minister of Health,16 based on epidemiology and community situation considerations.17 Epidemiology considerations are based on epidemiological data (numbers of patients, number of fatalities, and methodology to manage the virus spread); social community situation considerations are based on socio-cultural, economic, and security aspects based on deliberation from the regent (Bupati in charge of a regency) to be reported to the Minister.18 For example, on 17 April 2020, DKI Jakarta was declared an area of ‘Large Scale Social Distancing’, which was then followed by other provinces.19

16.  Another important law used during the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia is the Health Quarantine Law. This law aims to protect the community from diseases or risk factors which lead to emergency health problems in the community. This law divides authority and responsibility between the central and local governments. The central Government is responsible for the handling and management of health quarantine in entry and exit points of the Indonesian territory, in collaboration with the local government. In this law, every person is entitled to basic health services during the quarantine session, as prescribed medically, including food and other essential needs.

17.  There was no debate on the President’s decision to use the Contagious Diseases Law and the Health Quarantine Law. At that time, the Parliament, the judiciary, and the people were grappling with the pandemic. The Parliament overall has played a small role in handling the pandemic.20

18.  This Health Qurantine Law specifically regulates community emergency for contagious diseases or from other sources, such as nuclear radiation, biological pollution, chemical contamination, bioterrorism, etc, which potentially spreads transboundary harm between countries. There are requirements to establish a community emergency.

19.  The Health Quarantine Law categorized quarantine into four types of quarantine: home quarantine, regional quarantine, hospital quarantine, and large-scale social restrictions. Due to Covid-19, the Indonesian Government chose a response of large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) which include school closures, places of worship closures, and distancing in public facilities. Based on this health quarantine law, the Government is responsible for medical needs, food, and essential needs of the people in quarantine. A similar approach was adopted for the June 2021 wave of Covid-19.

C.  Executive rule-making powers

20.  As of 30 September 2021, at least 170 Covid-19-related laws, and 712 ministerial-level regulations and decisions have been adopted in the form of new regulations or amendments to existing non-pandemic specific regulations, following the standard method of law creation—new laws and amendments by parliamentary votes, Government regulations made/amended by the head of that body. 21 At the local level, at least 1,200 local regulations on Covid-19 had been adopted by local governments (provincial, regency, and city levels) between 12 March 2020 and 30 September 2021.

21.  Provincial regulations and bylaws cannot conflict with higher norms, such as laws and other primary legislation and the Constitution.22

22.  Most Covid-19-related regulations have been carried through the executive and its apparatus, as directed by the Covid-19 Management and National Economy Revitalization Task Force (Covid-19 Task Force) (Komite Penanganan Covid dan Pemulihan Ekonomi Nasional) set up through Government regulation. The Government made new Covid-19 regulations under the powers conferred by the Contagious Diseases Law, the Health Quarantine Law, and the Regional Government Law.23 Such regulations and subsequently enacted bylaws required no further approval from the legislative branch of the Government, as the powers to interpret and enact rules based on these laws generally lay with the executive branch through presidential, Government, or ministerial regulations.

23.  In relation to the Contagious Diseases Law, the existing legislation provided the Government with extended regulatory powers once it has decided that a contagious disease situation has taken place. This law specifically determined that the Minister of Health is responsible for assigning areas/regions as contagious; organizing contagious diseases management; regulating damages for parties bearing the costs because of contagious diseases management; and several criminal clauses for the act or negligence of stopping contagious diseases management, and the act of negligence of handling substances which cause contagious diseases.

24.  There has been almost no parliamentary scrutiny and checks and balances from the Parliament/DPR of the regulations adopted pursuant to the Contagious Diseases Law and Health Quarantine Law, as is mandated by their broad monitoring function in Article 20A(1) of the 1945 Constitution.

25.  There are several notable Covid-19-related cases being presented to the judiciary. In March 2020, the President enacted an Interim Emergency Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang/Perpu) No 1 Year 2020 on the State’s Financial Policy and Financial Stability System for the Handling of Covid-19,24 which was opposed by many NGOs and members of academia because the regulation gave legal immunity to certain financial officials.25 The Interim Emergency Regulation was taken to the Constitutional Court by three NGOs,26 but was rejected by the Court because the Interim Emergency Regulation was already enacted by the DPR into Law No 2 Year 2020 on the State’s Financial Policy and Financial Stability System for the Handling of Covid-19.27 On this subject the Parliament was supporting the Government in expediting the enactment of the Interim Emergency Regulation into Law, in order to give legal basis for the Government to enact policies and take extraordinary steps for alleviating the crisis.

26.  In May 2020, two lawyers launched a lawsuit before the Constitutional Court with regards to the Health Quarantine Law, where they were questioning the travel ban during the large-scale social distancing period and why the Government chose large-scale social distancing instead of lockdown. This lawsuit was rejected by the Constitutional Court. Another case on crowd pulling events28 ended up with the sanctioning of the perpetrator with a fine of IDR 20 million (USD $1,400).29 There are several cases of bribery and corruption with regards to Covid-19 relief funds, which are still ongoing. For further examples of cases, please see Part III.C below.

D.  Guidance

27.  Official guidance by the public authorities is gathered on several websites, published by the Government, specifically by the Covid-19 Task Force.30

28.  Legal rules enacted to control infection are binding and violations may be subject to fines or criminal charges, whereas guidance to the public is advisory. Directives given to public authorities are binding within the limits of the law. Guidance is used extensively to supplement legal rules, and to affect behaviour by resort to soft recommendations instead of using hard law. However, many Government regulations—particularly those delineating restrictions below—often include an obligation to follow prevailing guidance, obfuscating the line somewhat. One example concerned the distribution of the Covid-19 vaccine. The Government has decided that everyone eligible to be vaccinated in Indonesia needed to be vaccinated for free.

III.  Institutions and Oversight

A.  The role of legislatures in supervising the executive

29.  Under the Article 20A(1) of the 1945 Constitution, the legislative branch of the Government (DPR) has three functions: legislative, budgetary, and monitoring. The DPR, together with the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), have the power to pass law, amend the Constitution, conduct formal inquiries, oversee the state’s budget, and dismiss the president and vice president in accordance with the Constitution.31 The legislative function includes compilation of the national legislation program (Prolegnas), compilation and discussion on draft laws, accepting submission of draft laws by the DPD, discussing draft laws submitted by the President or the DPD, enacting laws together with the President, and approving or disapproving interim emergency regulations—submitted by the President—to be enacted as law.32

30.  The budgetary function of the Parliament includes: approving draft laws and the annual national budget, paying attention to the DPD’s advice on draft laws on the national budget and laws on taxes, education, and religion, following up on investigative results of State financial reports submitted by the Indonesian Audit Board (BPK), and giving approval to changes in ownership of State assets or international agreements with significant impacts for the people and impacting the State’s finances.33

31.  The monitoring function of the Parliament includes:34

  1. (1)  compiling and following up on the people of Indonesia’s aspirations—referring to citizen and voter aspirations, essentially representing the voice and scrutiny of the electorate;

  2. (2)  providing approval to the President (i) to declare war or peace with other nations, and (ii) to enact and impeach members of the Judicial Committee;

  3. (3)  giving advice to the President on (i) amnesty and abolition, (ii) appointing ambassadors, (iii) accepting placement of ambassadors from other nations, and (iv) selecting members of the BPK with suggestions from the Regional Representative Council;

  4. (4)  giving approval to the Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial) on selected Supreme Judge candidates to be appointed as Supreme Judge by the President;

  5. (5)  selecting three Constitutional Judges to be presented to the President.

32.  Unless otherwise stated in the laws that it creates, the DPR does not have the power to terminate/revoke previously given powers without a normal vote, nor are they typically up for renewal, except in cases of interim emergency regulations.

33.  The DPR has inherent constitutional rights, which are:35 (i) an interpellation right, where the DPR can ask questions to the Government for clarification on important, strategic, and issues with a large impact; (ii) inquiry rights, where the DPR can investigate the implementation of laws and regulations; (iii) rights to express opinion, where the DPR can express an opinion on governmental policies or extraordinary events in or outside the country; (iv) inquiry rights regarding the implementation of inquiry rights and interpellation rights of the DPR; and (v) the right to raise an accusation regarding the President or Vice-President’s illegal activities, including treason, corruption, crime, etc. The DPR can also express its will to impeach the President and Vice-President.

B.  The functioning of the legislature where its ordinary business is disrupted

34.  The current Government entered the Covid-19 pandemic with a supermajority coalition in Parliament—of seven parties, including the origin party of the main presidential contender, who currently serves as the Minister of Defence—in place since the 2019 elections, holding 471 seats out of 575. The opposition is constituted of two parties holding 104 seats. This unusual amount of power perhaps explains the lack of parliamentary scrutiny towards the executive, as the executive and the legislature are very closely linked.

35.  The Indonesian Parliament was not closed nor subject to an unusually long recess during any period of the pandemic. It adopted a mix of hybrid meetings and continued to work remotely.36 The Parliament’s official website lists several meetings and field visits with regards to Covid-19,37 but public information on how Parliament is monitoring pandemic management in Indonesia is scarce. When available, it is in the form of global diplomacy—how Indonesia has been assisting or was assisted by other countries during the pandemic, seemingly detaching itself from the struggle of its own Indonesian citizens.38

36.  Media outlets report that MPs have been performing their routine activities in a ‘business as usual’ mode. For example, these include approving the State budget during the plenary meeting held on Indonesian Independence Day (17 August 2020); legalizing the controversial bill called the ‘Omnibus Law’;39 and supporting legislative processes like confirming an interim emergency regulation into law and/or compiling national legislation programs (Prolegnas) for the next year. The Parliament also carries out the budgetary process, another routine role. The State fund budget reallocation in 2020 increased to IDR 62.3 trillion (USD $4.3 billion), from the initially planned IDR 23 trillion (USD $1.6 billion).40 Aside from their routine activities and news reports about how the family members of Parliament members were given priority for vaccine inoculations, the legislative branch has little to show for pandemic-related activities and successes.41

37.  The only non-routine activities the Parliament has conducted was to establish an ad hoc Covid-19 body within the Parliament (with no legal status).42 It distributed herbal medicine to hospitals despite the medicine having no permit from the Food and Medicine Authority, causing a protest from herbal medicine entrepreneurs.43

C.  Role of and access to courts

38.  The Indonesian court system is broadly divided in two: a Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) which generally oversees the work of the judiciary as a whole and lower courts, and a separate Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) tasked with, among others, interpreting the Constitution, ruling on elections and political parties’ disputes, and on the distribution of power between State institutions. Most civil and criminal trials are run through the hierarchy of district courts (pengadilan negeri) usually at regency level (kabupaten), appeals to high courts (pengadilan tinggi) usually at the provincial level (provinsi), and a final cassation to the Supreme Court.

39.  The court system is not precedent-based, and it is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. A judge is not bound by previous decisions of the high court, and judges act as an impartial referee in enforcing the rules of evidence and legal procedure. The four strands of law in Indonesia, namely Adat law, Islamic law (Sharia), national law, and colonial Dutch law are still very much alive in Indonesia, and although Indonesia gained independence in 1945, the colonial East-Indies codes for civil, criminal, and business law are still in use in Indonesia.

40.  In response to Covid-19, the Supreme Court issued a circular letter on 23 March 2020 which outlined changes to court procedure.44 It allowed judges and court officials to work from home for most activities, including holding trials using e-Court which is an application for online court business, including an e-Litigation addition for court proceedings, carry out administration, and coordinate other meetings.45 However, at least two officials must still be physically present at the court buildings to maintain a minimum amount of public service otherwise not available online. These individuals include judges and court officials and are assigned on a rolling basis, mandated to socially distance with the public, and to have medical face masks and gloves to protect themselves and others. The use of hand sanitizer and infrared thermometers are also required by the circular letter for each court. Judges and court officials working from home are not allowed to leave their residence except for necessities such as food, health, or their safety, and report to their direct superiors—they are not allowed to travel to other cities or return to their hometowns during lockdown.

41.  Criminal, military, and criminal violations of Islamic Sharia law in Aceh (jinayat) cases may still take place physically, while civil, religious, and administrative trials are to be moved to e-litigation where possible. For physical trials, the judges are given discretion to delay the trial, limit the number of spectators to the trial, and control their distance between each other during trial.46 Judges are also given discretion to ban physical contact or require protective equipment or tests, such as a thermometer test.

42.  The extent of digitization of court procedure and trials depends heavily on the infrastructure of each court and the supporting infrastructure for users. As such, more remote courts’ districts and their service areas in Indonesia may have less access to justice. For example, in the capital city of Jakarta, criminal trials could take place partially through teleconference (where available) for defendants who are currently detained.47 The judge, bailiff, prosecutor, and defence team are still required to be present in the courtroom, with the defendant being teleconferenced in for the reading of the charges, witness and defendant’s examination, arguments, and sentencing. In theory this has been extended to all courts where possible through the April 2020 Joint Agreement between the Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office, and Ministry of Law and Human Rights on Trials through Teleconference.48 The BBC reported in August 2020 that electronic trial facilities were still a problem in many areas with poorer infrastructure.49 In particular, jails, prisons, and prosecutors’ offices, which were not initially designed to handle fully online work, struggled. In the same article, the Secretary General of the Indonesian Bar Association noted that the main barrier to online trials was poor internet connection, and that judges could not adequately examine defendants through teleconference or ensure that they were not being pressured by others in the room.

43.  The e-Litigation system50 was mandated in April 2018 through a Supreme Court regulation51 and launched a few months later. It was initially capable of carrying out most document-related legal procedures such as lawsuits, applications, responses, counterpleas, rejoinders, conclusions, and store case dossiers, but was incapable of handling mediation or evidentiary hearings—later available after being mandated by a Supreme Court regulation in August 2019.52 Payment and summons can also be conducted online. Advocates may access this system after registering, while other users include State attorneys, government officials, military personnel, police, company directors, individuals, and holders of power of attorney. While this system is theoretically available to most courts, judges may still require parties to physically be in the courtroom for evidence and witness examination or where no internet access is present. There have been reports that courts had to shut down intermittently due to judges or court officials contracting Covid-19, such as in Surabaya where, at one point, seven judges and 27 officials contracted Covid-19.53

44.  Electronic litigation is also available for cases before the Indonesian Business Competition Commission—handling anti-trust, business competition, mergers, etc—as per their regulation,54 and should be able to handle submission, clarification, investigation, hearings, and examination, as well as monitoring remedies through teleconference or other electronic documents through email.

45.  By the end of 2018, the e-court system was in theory fully active for all general, religious, and administrative courts; as of 2020 however, its efficacy and ability to handle the vastly increased online caseload due to the pandemic is lacking. Its user base comprised 12,856 registered users and, of those, 11,507 are verified advocates. In 2018 the system handled 445 general civil cases, 442 religious court cases, and 20 administrative court cases.55 This is in comparison to a total of 5,573,114 general court cases, 632,876 religious court cases, and 3,979 administrative court cases handled in 2018.56 In 2019 the civil court system saw 6,112,570 general court cases, 677,608 religious court cases, and 3,240 administrative court cases.57 Of these, 21,895 general court cases, 24,776 religious court cases, and 573 administrative court cases were carried out through the e-court system.58

46.  According to the 2020 report, the head of the Supreme Court noted at the 2020 report’s press conference that a total of 186,987 cases of first instance were filed with the e-court system in 2020, compared to much lower numbers at the time of its release in 2018.59 Of those, 8,560 have been resolved through e-litigation—294 appeal cases were filed through e-Court.60 As of the end of 2020, the e-court system hosts 36,077 registered advocates and 83,332 other users, including individuals, Government, legal entities, and other holders of power of attorney. He also reported that since Supreme Court Regulation 4/2020 on electronic handling of criminal cases, around 115,455 criminal, military, or jinayat cases have been handled online.61 The Attorney General’s office stated that they have carried out 573,953 online criminal trials during the Covid-19 pandemic.62 The 2020 report also noted a total caseload of 3,321,294 civil and criminal cases, 656,462 religious court cases, 2,380 military cases, and 2,971 administrative law cases, with an average clearance rate of 97.83%.63 Notable is the reduction of nearly three million civil and criminal cases received as compared to 2019, noting a marked decrease in filings to general courts.

47.  As a comparison, 2019 saw a total caseload of 6,112,570 civil and criminal cases, 677,608 religious court cases, and 2,738 military, 3,240 administrative law, and 11 jinayat cases handled by all courts, with an averageclearance rate of 97.97%.64

48.  Several pieces of research, including from the Indonesian Ombudsman, have found that there is a significant gap in the technical skills required for online usage in Government employees.65 There have been concerns regarding the parties’ digital competence and how it might negatively impact their cases,66 however there does not seem to be any large-scale research as yet which focuses on the competence of the disputing parties.

49.  Trials for criminal, military, and jinayat defendants whose detention could still be extended are initially to be delayed until after Covid-19 restrictions are lifted—prosecutors may request that a defendant be detained for trial for up to 20+30 days, and first instance judges may hold defendants in detention for up to 30+60 days. Those whose detention cannot be extended will undergo trials. The decision to delay these trials can now be carried out by a single judge, full trials still generally require three judges. Trials which have time limits defined by law can have the time limits extended, as long as the order notes the extraordinary condition recognized in the Supreme Court circular letter.67

50.  Courts do have the power to determine the limits of declarations of a state of emergency, but these powers are handled by a different court according to the legal framework used to invoke such a state of emergency or exception. Acts (Undang-undang) made by the House of Representatives (DPR) or interim emergency regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang) issued by the Government could be challenged through a judicial review before the Constitutional Court, where it will be tested against the Indonesian Constitution. Most other Government regulations below that could be challenged in a material review—against broad legislation and legal products, as opposed to an administrative decision review before the administrative court—before the Supreme Court and will be tested against the Constitution and any other relevant legal norm, including fairness, good governance principles, and, potentially, international norms. Some specific Government acts, which fall under the ambit of administrative acts, are subject to review by the administrative courts, which are under the Supreme Court. None of these courts have powers proprio motu and rely on parties initiating procedures. Several cases have arisen out of Covid-19-related regulations, such as multiple challenges to the overarching Covid-19 Financial Policy Law and Omnibus Jobs Law before the Constitutional Court,68 the judicial review against the Jakarta Provincial Regulation No 2 before the Supreme Court,69 and the administrative law case on Micro-Scale Restriction on Public Activities.70 HukumOnline, a prominent law news outlet, has also published an opinion piece questioning whether the Government as a whole could be sued for failing to be prepared for the pandemic.71

D.  Elections

51.  Indonesia had planned to carry out elections for many local government positions on 23 September 2020.72 Nine governor seats (administering provinces or provinsi), as well as 37 mayor and vice-mayor seats (administering cities or kota), and a total of 224 regent and vice-regent seats (administering regencies or kabupaten) were up for elections. However, due to the spread of Covid-19, this was delayed. On 17 March 2020, the Electoral Oversight Commission (Bawaslu) recommended the Electoral Commission map out the various districts’ readiness to hold elections during Covid-19, with the Government initially optimistic about its initial September plans. By 25 March 2020, the Electoral Commission advised the President that an interim emergency regulation was required to postpone elections. The Government, legislature, and Electoral Commission agreed to delay elections on 30 March 2020. Three options were initially proposed, these being 9 December 2020, 17 March 2021, or 29 September 2021.

52.  On 14 April 2020 it was agreed that elections were to be delayed by three months from the original schedule, to be held on 9 December 2020, and the interim emergency regulation (No 2/2020) to that effect was issued on 5 May 2020.

53.  Candidate registration in 270 areas opened starting from 4–6 September 2020, with candidates being barred from amassing congregations or convoys—not all candidates heeded this rule. Official campaigning began for 71 days starting from 26 September 2020. Relevant electoral sanctions for these violations include warnings, forced disbandment, delaying the lottery draw to determine the numerical position on the election ballot, as well as the generally applicable Covid-19-related sanctions for mass gatherings.73

54.  Elections were held on 9 December 2020. The Electoral Commission required that temperature checks, hand-sanitizers, face masks, and handwashing be carried out/used by voters, whereas election officials were provided with more protective equipment such as hazmat suits. There are reports that prior to the election, several areas still had inadequate equipment or were otherwise noncompliant with health protocols, or that the election officials were yet to undergo Covid-19 testing.74 The Electoral Commission reported in January 2021 that the total participation rate for the 2020 elections actually increased from 69.06% in 2015 to 76.09% in 2020, despite fears that there would be lower participation.75

55.  During the 2020 elections, the Electoral Oversight Body handled 1,532 alleged administrative violations, some of which involve Covid-19-related violations,76 while the Indonesian Human Rights Commission noted various human rights issues such as insufficient protection for voters against Covid-19.77

E.  Scientific advice

56.  Indonesia’s Covid-19 Task Force was established by Presidential Regulation No 7/2020 and answers directly to the President. The regulation gave the Task Force broad discretion to coordinate the Covid-19 response but made no mention of reliance on scientific advice, protection, or publication thereof. It was subsequently replaced by a new Covid-19 Task Force which had the additional task of coordinating recovery,78 requiring them to ‘[carry out] relevant strategic policies to handle Covid-19 quickly and accordingly’,79 but likewise made no reference to scientific advice, protection, or publication thereof.

57.  Most Indonesian regulations do not require scientific advice for creating legislation or carrying out policy. Several regulations do require scientific data or advice to be a part of the operating procedures for specific processes, such as declaring an emergency outbreak or determining levels of quarantine, but do so with vague language. For example, consider:

Before implementing a national health emergency, the central Government will determine the type of disease and risk factors which may cause a national health emergency.80

Large-scale social restrictions … must be based on epidemiological considerations, the scale of the threat, effectivity, resources, technical operations, political, economic, social, cultural, defence and security considerations.81

58.  There seems to be no concerted legal protection for the existence of open publication of scientific advice. We cannot conclude at this moment whether scientific advisers and their advice are independent from the Government, either in a de facto or de jure sense.

59.  The primary umbrella dictating the requirements of Indonesian legal products is found in the Law on Development of Laws and Regulations.82 It governs the formulation and amendment of most regulations from the Constitution down to municipal/regency regulations, and mainly deals with the procedures to draft and enact those regulations. It does not specifically require that specific scientific advice or data be present to support the creation of legislation, but only that the legislation adhere to broad principles of clarity of purpose, practicability, necessity and usefulness, and openness,83 subject to interpretation. Acts made by the DPR and local regulations made by the DPRD require the commission of an academic study (naskah akademik) to prove their necessity and compatibility with existing regulations. In practice, many of these do not contain scientific research or data-gathering, and many are not published or easily accessible. They are published or accessible in cases of legislation which the drafters knew was going to be contentious, or subsequently became so. Other regulations may proceed without an academic study.

60.  The primary pieces of (pre-Covid-19) legislation relied on to combat Covid-19 are the 1984 Contagious Disease Law, the 2007 Disaster Management Law, the 2009 Health Law, and the 2018 Health Quarantine Law.

61.  The Contagious Diseases Law specifically names epidemiological investigation as part of the key efforts to contain outbreaks and charges the executive with this task through Government regulations.84 All persons and Government bodies with knowledge of an outbreak or potential patient must report it to authorities above them in their relevant chain of command.85 It criminalizes those intentionally or by inaction preventing outbreak containment but does not contain a requirement to heed or protect scientific information or advice. Government Regulation No 40/1991, which implements the Contagious Diseases Outbreak Law, does require that a determination of whether locations are considered under an outbreak by the Minister of Health is to be done based on epidemiological consideration and social conditions.86 Specifically, for the former, the rate of infection, number of deaths, and possible prevention methods. It lists epidemiological investigation as part of efforts for outbreak containment but does not specifically require the latter in the same language as used to determine whether an area is considered to be experiencing an outbreak as in Article 2 of Government Regulation No 40/1991. It does state that epidemiological investigation is to be carried out to determine the best method to contain an outbreak, but not necessarily that the means to contain an outbreak must be based on such research;87 only that containment be done ‘safely and appropriately … with appropriate technology’.88 It further lays out an alternative (debatably non-exhaustive) set of activities which comprise epidemiological investigation and their purposes in Article 11(1)–(2). No protection is given to informants or scientific advice, nor is there a requirement to publish such advice or information. A similar stance is held in the implementing ministerial regulations prior to and during Covid-19;89 the latter of which, while indeed containing epidemiological data relating to Covid-19, does not widely cite specific research, studies, or other data/findings.

62.  Neither the Disaster Management Law or the Health Quarantine Law expressly require scientific advice to be solicited or followed.

63.  The Health Quarantine Law governed the macro level workings of movement restrictions in cases of outbreaks but did not have an implementing Government regulation (as mandated in Articles 10(4), 11(3), 14(2), 48(6), and 60) prior to the Covid-19 outbreak.90 It was only after the start of the pandemic that on 31 March 2020 the Government issued Government Regulation No 21/2020 on Large Scale Social Restrictions.91 The language used here is similar to the previous regulations, in which data and science were used as part of the process of determining and carrying out various levels of quarantine or movement restrictions, but not as a standalone indispensable requirement,92 let alone being protected and published openly.

64.  Prior to Covid-19, it should be noted that the Presidential Instruction No 4/2019 regarding increasing capabilities to respond to diseases, pandemics, nuclear, biological, and chemical emergencies was enacted, which directed various central and regional agencies to take a coordinated response to such threats. Morris, while assessing the tension between the Indonesian central and local governments’ responses to Covid-19, noted that the regulation was phrased vaguely ‘as to be of questionable practical value beyond serving to strengthen arguments for making appropriate budget allocations and … a framework for reporting on progress’.93

65.  The main initial instruments created during Covid-19 were the 2020 Covid-19 Financial Policy Law governing macro-level economic and trade policies,94 the 2020 Large Scale Social Restriction Regulation implementing named action,95 and the 2020 Covid-19 Task Force Presidential Regulation creating the overseeing task force.96

66.  The Covid-19 Financial Policy Law allowing for discretion on import, export, monetary, and fiscal policies in response to the pandemic makes no provision that such actions be carried out on the basis of specific scientific advice. The Large Scale Social Distancing Regulation requires that such measures be based on epidemiological considerations which finds that the infection or death rate is increasing rapidly and is transmissible to other areas.97 It does not, however, protect nor require such epidemiological information to be publicly accessible or accountable.

F.  Freedom of the press and freedom of information

67.  Indonesia’s World Press Freedom Index score fell according to Reporters Without Borders between 2019 and 2020,98 but its overall rank rose, perhaps indicating a global trend of worsening press freedom during Covid-19. A joint report by several NGOs has provided a review on this topic.99 In general, while most top-level regulations have not significantly changed, the implementation of those regulations seems to have adversely affected press and information freedoms during Covid-19. The joint report noted that there did not seem to be a concerted effort from the Government to issue regulations protecting press—both in terms of employment guarantee and safety during work—and what regulations were enforced seemed to provide a broader ambit for law enforcement action adversely affecting freedom.

68.  It does not seem that there have been Government-instituted changes to journalistic practices during the Covid-19 pandemic, only that they should follow generally applicable guidelines, but the Alliance of Independent Journalists have issued their own guidelines to ensure safe reporting during the pandemic.100 News outlets initially seemed to have varying degrees of Covid-19 preparedness and responses. Additionally, newsrooms were hit quite hard by the pandemic and many outlets have suffered significant revenue losses.101 Individual journalists have suffered from pay cuts and layoffs,102 indirectly undermining freedom of press and information.

69.  Among the key concerns to press freedom is the 2008 Electronic Information and Transaction Law,103 which critics say contains overly broad provisions criminalizing online publication of information, outlawing immoral, defamatory/insulting, hate speech, fake news, and blasphemous content. While this legislation remains unchanged, media and researchers have been critical of the Indonesian Government’s de facto actions towards the press regarding Covid-19, with journalists falling victim to doxing,104 DDoS attacks, and death threats.105

70.  The Joint Report noted that out of 125 respondents, 35 respondents have been censored during the pandemic with 21 of 35 reporting that the censorship is related to Covid-19.106 Further, out of 125 respondents, 48 have experienced a denial of access to information, with 41 out of 48 of those responses being Covid-19-related information.107

71.  On 4 April 2020, the Indonesian National Police issued a telegram instructing the police apparatus to prosecute any hoaxes related to Covid-19, insulting the President or Government officials, and the illegal sale of medical equipment.108 Other such letters were issued by the police regarding cybercrimes, potential crimes during large-scale social distancing, how to handle returning Indonesian workers, and specific hate speech/hoaxes/insulting the Government. The first two had a broad ambit of interpretation. It should also be noted that the Constitutional Court had in 2006 ruled that insulting the President is no longer considered a valid crime within a democratic society.109 Among the efforts of the National Police to persecute ‘hoaxes’ was a concerted campaign with internet providers to provide information and stronger cyber-monitoring of online Covid-19-related issues. The telegram also contained instructions to ‘prosecute strongly’ and ‘expose all incidents to deter perpetrators.110

72.  Scientific data used for policy or legislative considerations are not expressly protected or open to the public. The Disaster Management Law, in theory, incorporates the use of science and technology, and transparency as basic principles,111 and provides the public access in written or spoken form to disaster management policies.112 It provides vague reference to data gathering as part of disaster prevention, response, and reconstruction,113 but similarly to the Contagious Diseases Law, it does not specifically require scientific advice to be an indispensable requirement for policy, nor that advice to be protected or publicly accessible.

G.  Ombuds and oversight bodies

73.  The Indonesian Ombudsman remains in charge of overseeing the State apparatus for maladministration during the pandemic, reporting many complaints of inactive Government services or a lack of alternatives,114 scrutinizing local governments,115 and the police.116 The 2020 annual report focuses on Government responses to Covid-19. In response to Covid-19, the Ombudsman has extended its complaints service by establishing an online outreach service and, through WhatsApp and Zoom,117 Ombudsman complaints rose from 10,478 total complaints in 2019 to 12,742 in 2020. It is not clear how much of the increase is attributed to Covid-19 or the Government response thereto, but the Ombudsman notes that 1,621 cases were submitted through their Covid-19 complaint portal.118

IV.  Public Health Measures, Enforcement and Compliance

74.  A specialized Covid-19 Task Force was set up to initially oversee and coordinate the public response across the country on 13 March 2020—this task force ultimately answered to the President. It was under the guidance of the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture, the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security, the Minister for Health, and the Minister for Finance. It was headed by the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), and assisted by army and police officials and various ministerial elements. On 20 March 2020, the list of guiding and working members was expanded to a much wider array of ministers and ministerial offices. On 20 July 2020, this was replaced with a new task force also in charge of recovery, comprising eight ministers, in charge of various sub-task forces defined in a later regulation.119 This task force is responsible for a wide range of Covid-19-related measures such as mobility restrictions, public health measures, and economic policy—the policies of which are carried out by respective ministries or local governments.

A.  Public health measures

75.  Indonesia enacted the presidential decree establishing the Covid-19 Task Force two days after Covid-19 was designated as a pandemic.120 This task force is responsible for: (a) increasing national resilience with regards to health; (b) expediting the management of Covid-19 through collaboration between governmental institutions, national institutions, and local governments; (c) increasing preparedness for the escalation of the spread of Covid-19; (d) increasing effectiveness of operational policy making; and (e) enhancing the Covid-19 response via better management of measures to prevent and detect Covid-19.

76.  Subsequently, the Ministry of Home Affairs Decree (No 20/2020) on expediting the Management of Covid-19 in the Regional Government was issued.121 Under this decree, a task force is to be established by each of the regions. Both regional and local governments are ordered to anticipate and manage the impact of Covid-19, and to prioritize Covid-19 management within existing local budgets. If there is no prior budget for Covid-19 management, local governments are to record their Covid-19 expenditure under the unexpected expenditure category and revise the annual budget as soon as possible.

77.  To provide further guidance on the implementation of the Ministry of Home Affairs decree, a ministerial circular letter was published on 29 March 2020.122 According to the letter, the Covid-19 regional task force is to be headed by the Regional Head (either the governor or head of region) and each region is authorized to independently declare a regional emergency situation, even in the absence of approval from the national Government. However, the fact that each region can declare its own emergency status is in opposition with the Health Quarantine Law. Furthermore, three months after the regional task forces were established, there were varying approaches towards Covid-19 management and handling across different regions in Indonesia. This may indicate that the national and regional governments are lacking coordination.

78.  The Government’s general database for health protocols can be found in their main Covid-19 response website,123 which contains many (but not all) of the main regulations and protocols related to the Covid-19 response. These health-related protocols have most recently included general guidelines for dealing with Covid-19 patients (lastly updated in February 2021), mental health support protocols for medical personnel issued in January 2021, hospital protocols, as well as local language guides for adaptive behaviour.124

79.  With the occurrence of natural disasters in various parts of the country, the Head of the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB), who also serves as the Chair of the Covid-19 Task Force, highlighted the importance of stringent health protocols for people affected by disasters and those living in displacement sites. Assistance provided to the survivors of the recent earthquake in West Sulawesi includes rapid antigen services for testing and tracing the transmission of Covid-19 in IDP (internally displaced people) sites.

1.  Individual mobility restrictions on citizens (stay-at-home, curfews, etc)

80.  Social distancing measures were also implemented via the Large-Scale Social Restriction Government Regulation.125 The regulation is largely similar to Article 59 of the Health Quarantine Law, although this regulation specifically focuses on Covid-19. It must also be noted that this regulation is unconventional. In Indonesia, ‘abstract substance’ legislation that deals with generalities should fall under Government regulations, whereas ‘concrete substance’ legislation that deals with specifics should be dealt with in presidential decrees or regulations. The Large-Scale Social Restriction Governmental Regulation, in dealing specifically with the management of Covid-19, is a ‘concrete substance’ legislation that should fall under a presidential decree instead.126

81.  Nevertheless, since large-scale social restriction was the option chosen by the Indonesian Government, all regions are required to adhere to the aforementioned regulation. In brief, the regulation provides for specific steps that the Government should take to manage Covid-19, the scope of the Government’s responsibility to its people during the pandemic, and budget allocation for the management of Covid-19.

82.  Generally, provincial governments will issue their own regulations following up on and relying on the legal basis provided by the Health Quarantine Law and the Social Distancing Government Regulation, with changes to the terms of social distancing being regulated by provincial legal regulations. On 9 April 2020, the capital city of Jakarta, for example, regulated social distancing and various other public health policy measures through a governor regulation relying on existing criminal law for sanctions,127 backed up Covid-19-related restrictions with new administrative sanctions on 19 August 2020,128 and further revised social distancing measures on 11 September 2020,129 extending them to at least 22 May 2021.130

83.  Initially, 18 areas (two provinces and 16 regencies/cities) enacted large-scale social distancing measures beginning in April 2020, reduced to seven areas in September 2020.131 As of 2021, there has been a shift towards less restrictive social distancing measures known as Micro-Scale Restriction on Public Activities (PPKM) enacted through the Minister of Home Affairs Instruction No 1 of 2021,132 and applicable to provinces in the heartland islands of Java and Bali. This regulation limits workplaces, restaurants, and shopping centres while fully allowing essential sector activities such as industry, public works, construction, basic goods distribution, and healthcare. As of March 2021, the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 6 of 2021 has extended this policy to 15 provinces up to 5 April 2021.133

84.  Starting in June 2021, Indonesia began to experience its worst Covid-19 outbreak, primarily driven by the Delta variant, with numbers returning to the levels observed before the wave in late September 2021. New rounds of ‘Restrictions to Community Activities’, which are a less strict form of restriction than those before, were announced for the Java and Bali areas starting on 3 July 2021, and in areas outside of Java and Bali from 12 July 2021.134 The general terms of these restrictions involve a 25% (essential Government services) up to 100% (non-essential sectors) work-from-home requirement for sectors, depending on their necessity. These determinations are carried out and extended through the Ministry of Home Affairs instructions based on a four-level system—level four being the strictest.135

2.  Restrictions on international and internal travel

85.  Domestic and international travel was also regulated during the Covid-19 pandemic. The protocol for international travellers depended on the country that they were travelling to or arriving from. All passengers and vessel crew must show no signs of infection and follow Covid-19 protocols, such as using face masks, washing hands with water or hand sanitizer, physically distancing, and implementing clean and healthy living guidelines—a broad term, later including specific activities such as reduction of conversation and banning food and drinks on planes.

86.  Updated almost daily, the travel ban in Indonesia has gone through a series of changes regarding the admission of foreign nationals in response to the discovery of a new variants of Covid-19. International travellers have to reconfirm their eligibility to an Indonesian embassy before entering Indonesia. These requirements are regulated in various ways through the Covid-19 Task Force circular letters,136 and are assessed in parallel to domestic social distancing guidelines.137

87.  A notable large-scale mobility policy taken by the Indonesian Government was the travel ban around the end of Ramadan, on 24–31 May 2020 and for the upcoming 2021 period. Around this national holiday period, large numbers of Indonesians travel back to their hometowns and families to celebrate Eid A-Fitr. In 2019, around 18 million travelled back home with public transportation and, millions more, privately.138 There was initial uncertainty in 2020 as to whether such travel would be allowed during the pandemic, but on 23 April 2020 the Minister of Transportation—empowered by the Health Quarantine Law and Government regulation—ruled that travellers by car, motorcycle, bus, train, ship, ferry, and flight were banned from entering and leaving areas where large-scale social restrictions or otherwise restricted travel were imposed,139 which, on 27 April 2020, included at least two provinces and 22 regencies/cities. International travel was unaffected, and exclusions applied to logistical transport and other necessary services.

88.  In 2021, the decision was made before the start of Ramadan, on 9 April 2021, which imposed a similar ban on transportation between 6 May–17 May 2021—the Islamic lunar calendar loses 11–12 days per year compared to the Gregorian calendar.140 The Minister of Transportation stated that, based on internal surveys, this policy aimed to prevent up to 81 million persons from travelling home, with 27 million persons projected to flout the travel bans.141

89.  The Government banned foreign entry on 2 April 2020 and again on 1 January 2021, and extended the temporary closure of the entry of foreign nationals to Indonesia until 25 February 2021. The extension is stipulated in the Circular Letter of the national Covid-19 Task Force No 2 of 2021, concerning the International Travel Health Protocol during the Covid-19 pandemic.142 This travel ban remained in place at the time of writing, with a few exceptions such as diplomatic reasons. The Coordinating Minister for Maritime and Investment stated at the end of March 2021 that Indonesia would likely re-evaluate these rules soon and may consider travel bubbles and exceptions for vaccinated foreigners.143 While the Covid-19 Task Force stipulates the top regulations on such entry, other Government agencies are involved in carrying out such policies.

90.  To give an idea of the differing scopes of implementation regarding international travel, the Covid-19 Task Force would stipulate the general policy applicable. The Ministry of Law would then regulate the visas and entry restrictions for foreign nationals in general144 or specific States,145 while the Foreign Ministry would issue further policies, such as o denial of entry from certain countries.146

91.  As of June–September 2021, domestic travellers must show proof of first vaccination, as well as a negative PCR H-2 test for air travel and negative antigen H-1 test for other means of long-distance transport, including private vehicles.147 Travel on airplanes is subject to more stringent regulations based on the Covid-19 Task Force and Ministry of Transport regulations, such as a ban on eating or drinking and excessive talking, the mandatory use of medical masks or three layered cloth masks, and mandatory vaccination cards.148

92.  International travel requires all travellers to present proof of full vaccination (dose number dependent on the vaccine) and to undergo a PCR test before and after arrival. Citizens and foreigners (except diplomats) are required to undergo an eight-day mandatory quarantine at their own cost.

3.  Limitations on public and private gatherings and events

93.  The early restrictions in January 2020 tended to limit public activities, such as work, and reduced capacity or working hours for restaurants and malls/shopping centres, as well as religious centres, but varied widely in the terms and comprehensiveness of measures. Public and private gatherings outside these establishments were not initially banned, but as the scale of the pandemic grew the restrictions tightened. Initial large-scale restrictions on public gatherings began in early April 2020 and were slowly lifted starting in early June 2020.149 For example, when Jakarta began its restrictions on 10 April 2020, it banned all public activities involving more than five persons, but—other than restrictions on certain public activities which may be carried out in the private sphere such as weddings and religious events—was generally silent on private gatherings in the house—a trend also found in other regions’ restrictions.150

94.  The early responses to Covid-19 tended to be marked by an overarching central regulation based on either the quarantine or health laws, the Covid-19 Task Force, or the Ministry of Health allowing provincial governments to carry out and determine the extent of their own restrictions. This approach later shifted as standardized restriction levels were implemented, and finally moved to a comprehensive definition of restrictions at the central level by the Ministry of Home Affairs during the June 2021 wave.151

95.  To control the increase in the number of Covid-19 cases, the Government imposed further restrictions on community activities from 11–25 January 2021. The restrictions were implemented for areas in Java and Bali that met predetermined parameters, namely the rate of deaths, recovered cases, active cases, and hospitals occupancy.152 The regions are determined by the governors in seven provinces (Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java, and Bali) and are carried out and supplemented by governors’ regulation, instructions, or circular letters.153

96.  As of June–September 2021, while there are no specific bans on general private gatherings, with the new round of restrictions several activities have been prohibited, such as limitations on food vendors to close at 8pm or to only offer takeaway (if indoors), maximum visitor numbers to shops and mall stalls, the closing of most public facilities and locations, and bans on weddings.154 There is, however, a temporary blanket ban on social activities which may cause crowds or congregations, which is open to interpretation.

4.  Closure of premises and facilities (eg, schools, shops, services, parks, churches, sports facilities)

97.  In line with mobility restrictions, premises and facilities were also closed or otherwise operated at reduced hours. The activities that are regulated include:155 (1) 75% work from home for offices; (2) fully online teaching and learning; (3) essential sectors operate at 100%; (4) shopping centres and malls operating until 7pm; (5) restaurants operating at a 25% capacity or take away; (6) construction operating at 100%; (7) worship spaces operating at a 50% capacity; (8) public facilities being closed and social and cultural activities being cancelled; and (9) public transportation services operating at reduced capacity and hours, depending on the severity of the disease in the region.

98.  Changes to working protocols in various Government-run or affiliated bodies are implemented by the overseeing Government agency, such as State-owned companies or workplaces,156 various ministries,157 and the courts.158 Ministries adjusted their working policies to account for the changes in mobility restrictions detailed in Part IV.A.1 above.

99.  As of June–September 2021, multiple closures and reduced capacity have been ordered for various services and sectors.159 At its highest restriction level (four), this comprises: between 25% and 100% work from home requirement for businesses; up to 50% reduction of capacity for shops and to close as early as 5pm; a 50% capacity reduction for places of worship; closure of all public facilities such as parks and tourist attractions; and closure of arts, culture, sports, or social activities which create crowds. Further restrictions may be adopted by local authorities if they deem it necessary.

5.  Physical distancing

100.  Physical distancing has been pushed by the Government and was initially set at one metre by the Covid-19 Task Force and was later revised to 2 metres as of 2 November 2020.160 This policy was reflected in various regulations which would require that distance of separation for, for example, the distance between tables for workers and between customers and service providers,161 or between general patients and family.162 The precise distance for general physical distancing would often not be mentioned in lower regulations such as those setting terms for large-scale restrictions, for example the most recent ones.163

6.  Use of face coverings and personal protective equipment (PPE)

101.  The use of face masks and protective equipment for the healthcare sector is mandated and regulated through the Minister of Health regulations and its implementing directives.164 Meanwhile, the public use of face masks and other protective equipment is generally tied to provincial or local social distancing regulations, as mandated by the Ministry of Health,165 with the imposition of sanctions dependent on local regulations, such as those in some Javanese provinces166 and Kalimantan.167 Protection and use of PPE in the workplace is discussed below in Part V.B.

102.  As of June–September 2021, the ‘correct and consistent’ use of face coverings when outside the house is mandatory for areas with level four restrictions, including the use of face masks when using face shields.168 In areas with lower restrictions, masks may be optional in certain situations, for example during physical exercise such as swimming.

7.  Isolation of infected individuals and quarantine of individuals suspected of infection

103.  Quarantine and isolation are both regulated under the Health Quarantine Law. Quarantine is a process to reduce risk of infection and to detect early Covid-19 infection through the separation of healthy individuals or symptomless individuals that have had contact with confirmed Covid-19 patients or with a travel history to outbreak areas. Isolation is a process to reduce the risk of contagion through the separation of sick individuals—confirmed by laboratories results or with Covid-19 symptoms—within the community at large. Early in the pandemic, the Indonesian Government, through its ministries, also enacted temporary bans on live animal imports from China and employment of Chinese labourers.169

104.  The Health Minister enacted the Health Ministry Decision on Guidance on Avoidance and Control of Covid-19, highlighting activities on public health management for Covid-19.170 These include, among other things, quarantine, monitoring, isolation, specimen checking, epidemiology detection, risk communication, and community capacity development to deal with health risks.

105.  The initial period set out for quarantine of all individuals was at least 14 days—and until a Covid-19 diagnosis is given—and was set in the Minister of Health Circular Letter of 16 March 2020.171 This was changed on 13 July 2020 through the Minister of Health advice that established a period of 14 days of quarantine only for individuals in close proximity to Covid-19 positive individuals, including healthcare workers—the latter enter 10 days of isolation if they are positively diagnosed with Covid-19, and if asymptomatic they may exit isolation.172 The decision also specified the possibility of carrying out mass quarantines for high-risk areas,173 such as one which occurred in Bondalem village in Bali.174 As of March 2021, quarantines may also be lowered to five days if a negative Covid-19 test is obtained from the sample gathered on the fifth day of quarantine. This is applicable both to international travel (Covid-19 Task Force) and close contacts as part of contact tracing (Ministry of Health).175

8.  Testing, treatment, and vaccination

106.  The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), Indonesia’s highly influential non-governmental body of Islamic scholarship, has declared the Covid-19 vaccine by Sinovac as halal.176 The declaration was stipulated in a fatwa (ruling on a point of Islamic law) issued on 8 January 2021. On 11 January 2021, the Food and Drug Administration (BPOM) issued an emergency use authorization for the vaccine. Following these two decisions, the Covid-19 vaccination program in Indonesia began on 13 January 2021, with the President of the Republic of Indonesia ceremonially given the first dose.177

107.  The first phase of vaccination took place from January–April 2021, targeting 1.3 million medical staff, 17.4 million civil servants, and 21.5 million senior citizens. The second phase was scheduled for April 2021–March 2022. This second phase is aimed at 63.9 million persons in vulnerable communities (‘red’ zones) and 77.4 million further persons, clustering based on regions, and based on vaccine availability.

108.  Presidential targets are to vaccinate 180 million Indonesians, with 30,000 vaccinators vaccinating 30 persons per day, and that the whole Indonesian population will be vaccinated in under one year.178 Realistically, due to health resources—the number of vaccines and number of vaccinators per region—the Ministry of Health target will likely be reached in March 2022, in 15 months.179 Only five provinces will likely be able to vaccinate their population within the one-year target: Jakarta, Aceh, Yogyakarta, North Kalimantan, and Bangka Belitung.180

109.  On 8 March 2021, Indonesia received 1,113,600 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine from the COVAX facility.181 These vaccines are produced in South Korea and sent through the AstraZeneca headquarters in Amsterdam, Netherlands. As part of the Advance Market Commitment financing for low- and middle-income countries, the COVAX facility will send 11,704,800 doses of vaccines to Indonesia in the first half of 2021 for free. This amount will push Indonesian vaccination to 181 million Indonesians, prioritizing medical staff, public service personnel, senior citizens, and vulnerable groups. The Indonesian vaccine program is notable as it prioritizes productive age citizens, public sector workers, and front-line workers, and not only elderly and vulnerable groups.182

110.  As of 21 September 2021, 127,209,288 vaccine does have been administered.183

9.  Contact tracing procedures

111.  Contact tracing in Indonesia remains weak, although the country is the worst hit in South-East Asia. A WHO report on Indonesia, published on 1 October 2020,184 reported that a survey of 259 surveillance workers in the country found that 65% of respondents said they were able to trace close contacts of more than 80% of confirmed cases. The report indicated that the most prominent hurdles are the stigma surrounding Covid-19 and the lack of contact tracers.185 As of 24 March 2021, the Government of Indonesia reported 1,476,452 (5,227 new) confirmed cases of Covid-19, 39,983 (118 new) deaths, and 1,312,543 recovered cases from 510 districts across all 34 provinces.186

112.  There is no national requirement that hospitality and similar venues record their entrants for contact tracing purpose, with the decision being delegated down to lower levels of government. The capital of Jakarta implemented this as part of its restrictions in 2020 for workplaces, places of worship, and hospitality venues, but did not digitize this information and only required it on paper.187

113.  Tools used for contact tracing are pen and paper tools, or locally developed digital applications. In many cases, Indonesia has gone ‘low tech’ rather than ‘high tech’. Local communities appointed their own health volunteers who took very serious steps in surveying their areas and making sure their areas were not contagious.188 They know the residents of their neighbourhood very well and immediately asked questions to ‘new faces’ arriving from outside of their neighbourhood.189 These local health volunteers can be trained and help the community health centres in contact tracing.190 For many health surveillance workers in the country, tracing is laborious work, as 86% of the workers surveyed revealed they still used paper-based methods, while only 9% used locally developed applications, according to the WHO report, and 5% did not document the procedure.191 The Ministry of Information has also produced a voluntary contact tracing app, the privacy and workings of which are summarized by Norton Rose Fulbright.192

114.  Local authorities are encouraged by the Government to strengthen the role of community health centres (Puskesmas) as they are the most capable to perform contact tracing adequately.193 Puskesmas are the backbone of public health across the nation, particularly in remote areas.194

115.  As of March 2021, the official procedure for contact tracing can be found in the Ministry of Health Handbook of 16 March 2021 (see flowchart below).195

116.  This procedure differs slightly from the 13 July 2020 guidance from the Minister which initially required a mandatory 14-day period and a negative PCR test, if possible, for all individuals suspected of Covid-19 infection and close contacts.

10.  Measures in long-term care facilities or homes for the elderly, restrictions on visitors etc.

117.  Among the best research on this subject has been the December 2020 quick research carried out by the Ministry of Welfare, covering public and private care facilities.196 Specific protection for elderly care has included a refocusing of budgets to protective and cleaning equipment, medicines, and tests, as well as better nutrition; a change to activities for residents which must comply with distancing measures; and increases in health checks and outdoor activities.

118.  Specific guidance for the elderly has been issued by the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection.197 The National Team on Poverty Eradication has found that, due to the pandemic, social services for the elderly were disrupted. It found that, for example, in the province of Yogyakarta in 2020, from 11 aid programs geared to the elderly, only five were carried out: food, social welfare for elders, home care, family support, and surgery subsidies.198 More specific research on elderly protection during the pandemic has also been carried out by the Ministry for Welfare with similar findings of disrupted service to the elderly and various related challenges.199

119.  In 2020, the Government also disbanded the specialized National Commission for the Elderly, established by Presidential Decree No 52 of 2004, which was tasked with assisting the President to coordinate and advise him on social welfare programs for the elderly.200

B.  Enforcement and Compliance

1.  Enforcement

120.  Enforcement of Covid-19 policies is split by reliance on legal basis, based on whether they are enforced by criminal sanctions or fines/administrative sanctions. No new criminal offences have been added to the criminal code in response to the pandemic. Instead, criminal sanctions that rely primarily on the Health Quarantine Law and police powers are based on an interpretation of the Criminal Code.201 Newer sanctions are those typically issued by local governments enforcing large-scale social distancing. In effect, while the written criminal sanctions have not changed, authorities have used existing laws to cover a larger variety of possible infractions brought about by Covid-19.

121.  The Health Quarantine Law sets out imprisonment and fines for various activities which would breach or hinder quarantine or isolation, for transportation providers, individuals, and corporations, as regulated in Articles 90–94. These range up to 10-year imprisonment and fines of IDR 15 billion. Crimes under this act are to be investigated by the police as well as specialized civil service investigators with jurisdiction in health-related crimes, as per Article 84 of the Health Quarantine Law.

122.  The Indonesian police, meanwhile, will rely on an interpretation of existing Criminal Code regulations. The primary regulation connecting police authority, Covid-19, and the Criminal Code is the National Police Chief Decree of 2020,202 which broadly decreed among others that:

  1. (a)  Public events must be barred, if they cause mass congregations. This includes social, cultural, religious, music, sports, entertainment, protests, and other activities. In cases of necessity such events should follow relevant guidelines.

  2. (b)  The public should follow information and formal recommendations from the Government.

  3. (c)  The public should avoid stockpiling excess necessities.

  4. (d)  The public should not be influenced by nor create fake news (see Part III.F above).

123.  Specific to Covid-19 health protocol compliance, the initial approach in March 2020 was to use ‘persuasive humane’ methods to push compliance against crowds gathering, but as Covid-19 cases rose and the country began social distancing protocols, enforcement likewise hardened—when dispersing crowds, the police stated that they could potentially work with the armed forces.203 A subsequent National Police Chief Telegram was issued on November 2020, which called for a strict enforcement of all Covid-19 health policies,204 whether based on national (the Health Quarantine Law and Police Law)205 or local regulations. Here the police are empowered by specific articles within the Criminal Code, namely Articles 212 and 214(1)–(2) (resisting an official carrying out its duties, with force or threat of force), 216 (resisting a lawful order or request from an official), and 218 (refusing a lawful order to disband in public). These carry individual penalties, ranging from fines to a maximum imprisonment of four months (resisting an order) up to a maximum of 15 years (causing death).

124.  Academics have noted that the police’s tendency to arrest individuals during the Covid-19 pandemic for such violations run against the Ministry of Law and Human Rights’ policy to avoid arrests and imprisonment wherever possible in order to minimize the prison and jail populations.206

125.  Administrative sanctions for non-compliance with Covid-19 protocols differ between provinces, with some not adopting sanctions at all. For example, in Jakarta, the sanctions for not wearing a face mask in public spaces or facilities include a written reprimand, community service, and a fine of up to IDR 250,000.207 In West Kalimantan, the sanctions include a verbal or written reprimand, 15 minutes of community service, fines of up to IDR 200,000, and a forced quarantine until a negative PCR swab result is obtained.208

2.  Compliance

126.  The Indonesian Government has carried out a voluntary survey on public behaviour during the Covid-19 pandemic between 7–14 September 2020,209 comprising of 65,561 members of the public and 25,406 Government-affiliated individuals. The survey found ‘good’ compliance with various health protective measures (masks, maintaining one metre physical distance, hand-washing, etc), between around 92% (mask wearing) to 73.5% (maintaining one metre physical distance), with women consistently being more thorough in carrying out protective measures.210 According to respondents, compliance with various protective measures was highest in public facilities of between 94.9% (mask use) and 82% (social distancing) and lowest in traditional markets and street vendors 82.6% (mask use) and 21.2% (thermogun use).

127.  Gaduh and others carried out mobility research in Indonesia, based on tracking of 60 million smartphone users between January and June 2020, focusing on a smaller subset of users regularly observed in the dataset.211 They found an increase of people staying within 200 metres of their night-time location from 50% in Jakarta and 60% nationwide, to around 80% after the President’s speech urging them to stay home on 15 March 2020. They did not find a significant level of change after lockdown policies and laws were implemented in April 2020, suggesting that ‘changes … related to individuals … had already taken place’. Google likewise monitors mobility trends which found that, as of 25 March 2021, visitors to retail and recreation saw a 16.7% reduction, public transit stations saw a 30.3% reduction, and workplaces a 22.4% reduction, since the start of the pandemic.212 These rates are already an increase from the harshest lockdown period in late April 2020, where the reductions were respectively 45.7% for retail, 62% for public transit, and workplaces seeing their lowest dip of 45.4% at the end of May 2020.

128.  The Covid-19 Task force noted that reported compliance with physical distancing and mask use remains problematic as of July 2021, with many regions not meeting the ‘75% compliance’ rate targeted by the Government.213

Linda Yanti Sulistiawati, Assoc. Prof, Faculty of Law, University of Gadjah Mada, Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

Ibrahim Hanif, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Gadjah Mada, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge


1  World Health Organization, ‘Covid-19 Indonesia’ (accessed 28 September 2021).

2  T Lindsey, Indonesia: Law and Society (Annandale, Federation Press 2008) 17.

3  J Asshiddiqie, Perkembangan dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Pasca Reformasi 7 (SekJen MK RI 2006) 12.

4  J Asshiddiqie, Perkembangan dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Pasca Reformasi 7 (SekJen MK RI 2006) 12.

10  C Morris, ‘Governing a Pandemic: Centre-Regional Relations and Indonesia’s COVID-19 Response’ New Mandala (Online, 20 November 2020).

11  A A Amesh et al, ‘The Character of Pandemic Patogen’ John Hopkins Center for Health Security (2018), 12.

14  Ministry of Health, Covid-19 Protocol Handbook 2nd Edition (January 2021); Covid-19 Task Force, ‘Protective equipment standards to handle Covid-19 in Indonesia’ (August 2020); Ministry of Health, ‘Covid-19 Prevention and Control Guidance’ (July 2020).

19  N A Loasana, ‘Jakarta extends transitional psbb to Dec 21 as cases surge’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 7 December 2021).

20  A Savirani and L Y Sulistiawati, ‘The Malady of ignorance? Indonesian parliament during the Covid-19 Pandemic’ New Mandala (Online, 6 April 2021).

21  This figure is based on those regulations published in the central legal repository, and other provincial or ministerial repositories, as the central repository is often incomplete. Most regulations dealing with the pandemic have ‘Covid-19’ or derivations thereof in their title; see Indonesian Government, ‘National Law Documentation and Information Network’ (accessed 28 September 2021).

25  Covid interim emergency regulation lawsuit keeps on coming’ Detiknews (Online, 17 April 2020).

27  DPR, ‘DPR Passes Perppu Number 1 of 2020 as Law’ (12 May 2020).

28  FPI leader Rizieq Shihab named suspect for holding crowd-pulling events’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 10 December 2020).

29  C Iswinarno and B Isdiansyah, ‘Failed appeal for crowd-pulling charge, Habib Rizieq fined IDR 20 Million’ Suara.com (Online, 4 August 2021).

30  Covid-19 Task Force, ‘Covid Task Force’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

31  Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia (Washington, DC), ‘Government’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

32  DPR, ‘Duties and Authorities’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

33  DPR, ‘Duties and Authorities’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

34  DPR, ‘Duties and Authorities’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

35  DPR, ‘Duties and Authorities’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

37  DPR, ‘News’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

39  G Galiya, ‘House submits final draft of jobs law to Jokowi’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 14 October 2020).

40  A Wail Akhlas, ‘$3.9 billion state spending reallocated for COVID-19 response: Sri Mulyani’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 20 March 2020).

41  Experts criticize DPR members’ and families being vaccinated in private’ CNN Indonesia (Online, 26 February 2021).

42  M AH Prabawanti, ‘DPR’s Covid-19 Task Force carries out 3 concrete acts to fight Covid’ Kompas (Online, 20 April 2020).

43  Jamu groups oppose House’s decision to import ingredients for Covid-19 cure’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 28 April 2020).

45  Supreme Court, ‘E-Court Home Page’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

50  Supreme Court, ‘E-Court Home Page’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

57  Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report 2019: Continuing Court Modernization’, 110.

58  Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report 2019: Continuing Court Modernization’, 136.

59  Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report 2020: Covid’, 147

60  Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report 2020: Covid’, 147.

61  Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report 2020: Covid’, 149.

63  Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report 2020: Covid’, 91.

66  A Mardatillah, ‘The Dillema of Online Trials in a Pandemic’ Hukum Online (Online, 27 May 2020).

69  Jakarta Covid Regulation sued; Vice-Governor views it as a lesson’ CNN (Online, 19 December 2020).

71  R M Sibuea, ‘Do we need to sue to the government for being unprepared against Covid’ Hukumonline (Online, 26 March 2020).

72  M Danang, ‘Chronology of the 2020 local elections during the Covid-19 pandemic’ Kompas (Online, 8 December 2020).

73  Electoral Commission Regulation No. 13 of 2020 (23 September 2020), arts 88A–88F.

74  M Danang, ‘Chronology of the 2020 local elections during the Covid-19 pandemic’ Kompas (Online, 8 December 2020).

76  R D Pettalolo and K Fahmi, ‘Assessing the handling of violations during the 2020 local government elections’ Election Oversight Body (2021), 172–177.

77  Indonesian Human Rights Commission, ‘Observations of the 2020 elections: Press Release’ (5 March 2021).

83  Law No 12 Year 2011 on Development of Laws and Regulations, arts 5(a), (d), (e), (g), and relevant elucidations.

90  F A Sjarif, ‘Is this the Government Regulation we had hoped would manage Covid-19 in Indonesia?’ Hukum Online (Online, 2 April 2020).

92  Law No 6 Year 2018 on Health Quarantine, arts 49, 53, 56, 59, 77.

93  C Morris, ‘Governing a Pandemic: Centre-Regional Relations and Indonesia’s COVID-19 Response’ New Mandala (Online, 20 November 2020).

98  Reporters Without Borders, ‘Indonesia’ (accessed 25 November 2021).

99  M Shader et al, ‘Covid-19 Pandemic: Press Freedom and Journalist Safety in Crisis’ ICJR/LBH PERS/IJRS (Online, February 2021).

100  Aliansi Jurnalis Independen/Jurnalis Krisis dan Bencana/Komite Keselamatan Jurnalis, ‘Safety Protocols for Covering and Publishing News on Covid-19: For journalists and media companies’ (15 March 2020).

101  F Pebrianto, ‘Survey: 70.2% of Mass Media impacted by Covid-19’ Tempo (Online, 24 July 2020).

102  A Nurbaiti, ‘Journalists face risk of Covid-19 infection, pay cuts and job losses’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 28 October 2020).

104  D Beard, ‘Photo of Covid-19 victim in Indonesia sparks fascination—and denial’ National Geographic (Online, 21 July 2020).

105  International Federation of Journalists, ‘Indonesia: Journalist subjected to death threats for Joko Widodo story’ (29 May 2020).

106  M Shader et al, ‘Covid-19 Pandemic: Press Freedom and Journalist Safety in Crisis’ ICJR/LBH PERS/IJRS (Online, February 2021), 37.

107  M Shader et al, ‘Covid-19 Pandemic: Press Freedom and Journalist Safety in Crisis’ ICJR/LBH PERS/IJRS (Online, February 2021), 44.

109  Constitutional Court Decision No 13-022/PUU-IV/2006 (4 December 2006), 62–63.

113  Law No 24 Year 2007 on the Management of Disasters, arts 35, 37, 38, 45, 48, 54, 58, 71.

114  Indonesian Ombudsman, ‘Reflections on overseeing public service during Covid-19’ (12 October 2020).

115  Indonesian Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsman reminds local governments to optimize Covid task forces’ (1 January 2021).

116  R Waseso, ‘Ombudsman recommends police improve administrative services during Covid-19Kontan (Online, 30 August 2020).

117  Indonesian Ombudsman, ‘Annual Report 2020: Escorting Public Service during Covid-19’, 18.

118  Indonesian Ombudsman, ‘Annual Report 2020: Escorting Public Service during Covid-19’, 15.

123  Covid-19 Task Force, ‘Covid Task Force’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

124  Covid Task Force, ‘Protocols’ (accessed 18 February 2022).

130  M FP Adjie, ‘Covid-19: Jakarta extends [large scale social restrictions] through Ramadan’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 22 April 2020).

131  From 18 areas, only 7 now carry out [large scale social restrictions]’ Detik (Online, 10 September 2020).

134  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Indonesia officially imposes restrictions towards community activities (PPKM)’ (2 July 2021); PPKM regulations for 15 provinces outside Java and Bali’ CNN (Online, 10 July 2021).

137  German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, ‘Covid-19 Developments in Indonesia’ (updated 29 March 2021).

138  R R Mufti, ‘Explainer: What’s allowed and what’s not in Indonesia’s “mudik” ban’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 29 April 2020).

140  Ministry of Transportation, ‘Minister of Transport Regulation to Control Transportation during Eid al-Fitr Issued’ (8 April 2021).

141  H Darmawan, ‘Minister of Tranport Regulation 13/2021 issued, bans transport operations starting 6 May’ Tribun News (Online, 8 April 2021).

142  H Darmawan, ‘Minister of Tranport Regulation 13/2021 issued, bans transport operations starting 6 May’ Tribun News (Online, 8 April 2021).

143  A Yuniar, ‘Government will allow foreign entry, with conditions’ Liputan6 (Online, 26 March 2021).

147  PPKM regulations in Java and Bali’ CNN Indonesia (Online, 3 August 2021).

149  S Dian Adriyanto (ed), ‘Name Changes in Covid-19 Restrictions: PSBB to 4 Scale PPKM’ Tempo.co (Online, 23 July 2021).

152  OCHA, ‘Situation Update: Response to Covid-19 in Indonesia’ (18 January 2020).

155  OCHA, ‘Situation Update: Response to Covid-19 in Indonesia’ (18 January 2020).

160  Covid-19 Task Force changes physical distancing to 2m’ CNN Indonesia (Online, 2 November 2020).

162  Ministry of Health, ‘Covid-19 Protocol Handbook 2nd Edition’ (January 2021), 5.

164  See generally Hukum Online, ‘Central Government Legal Products on Health’ (accessed 25 November 2021).

174  Buleleng Regency Government, ‘Bondalem village cases lowered, regent carries out joint prayers’ (16 December 2020).

176  OCHA, ‘Situation Update: Response to Covid-19 in Indonesia’ (18 January 2020).

177  Indonesian Cabinet Secretariat, ‘President Jokowi Receives First Dose of Covid-19 Vaccine’ (13 January 2021).

179  A Arshad, ‘Indonesia's Covid-19 vaccination drive an uphill task’ The Strait Times (Online, 25 January 2021).

180  A Surianta, ‘Only 5 Provinces can Complete Vaccinations Goals in One Year’ Kompas (Online, 6 February 2021).

181  WHO, Covid-19 Indonesia Summary of Actions – 10 (15 March 2020).

182  S Widianto and T Diela, ‘Why Indonesia is vaccinating its working population first, not elderly’ Reuters (Online, 4 January 2021).

183  World Health Organization, ‘Covid-19 Indonesia’ (accessed 28 September 2021).

184  WHO, Covid-19 Indonesia Situation Report – 27 (30 September 2020), 14.

185  S Atika, ‘Covid-19 Surveillance remains lacking in Indonesia’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 8 October 2020).

186  WHO, Covid-19 Indonesia Situation Report – 48 (15 March 2020), 1.

188  C Lova, ‘Bekasi Neighborhood Chief’s Duties during the Covid-19 Pandemic’ Kompas (Online, 26 June 2020).

189  B Marhaenjati, ‘Positive Cases Increase, Covid-19 Investigators Sent to Jakarta’ BeritaSatu (Online, 7 June 2021).

190  Salatiga Submunicipality (Kelurahan), ‘Mayor to Optimize Neighborhood and Local Chief’s Roles to Handle Covid-19’ (8 April 2020).

192  Norton Rose Fulbright, ‘Contact Tracing Apps in Indonesia’ (11 May 2020).

193  S Atika, ‘Covid-19 Surveillance remains lacking in Indonesia’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 8 October 2020).

194  S Atika, ‘Covid-19 Surveillance remains lacking in Indonesia’ The Jakarta Post (Online, 8 October 2020).

195  Ministry of Health, ‘Handbook for Contact Tracing for Covid-19 Cases’ (16 March 2021), 6.

196  Muhtar et al, ‘Quick Research: Social Protections for the Elderly during Covid-19’ Ministry of Welfare, Social Welfare Research Centre (December 2020).

197  Deputy for Women’s Right Protection, KPPPA, ‘Guidance on Protecting the Elderly through a Gender conscious perspective during Covid-19’ (2020).

198  TNP2K & the SMERU Research Institute, ‘The Elderly in Indonesia and Access to Social Protection Programs: Analyzing secondary data’ (November 2020), 30.

199  A Kurniasari et al, ‘Elderly Social Protection during Covid-19: Government and Community social institutions for the elderly’ Ministry of Welfare Research Centre (December 2020), 115–121.

200  D E Nugraheny, ’10 non-structural institutions disbanded by Jokowi: a summary’ Kompas (Online, 1 December 2020).

201  Indonesian Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht).

203  M A Yozami, ‘Criminal sanctions for noncompliant citizens congregating in groups’ Hukum Online (Online, 23 March 2020).

204  National Police Chief Telegram ST/3220/XI/Kes.7./2020 on Enforcement of Health Protocols (16 November 2020); text not available online, summary found in I Maharani, ‘Contents of Police Chief Telegram’ Tribun-Timur (Online, 17 November 2020).

206  A Prasetyo, ‘Criminal Law Academics speak up on Arrests related to Large Scale Social Restrictions’ Hukum Online (Online, 7 April 2020).

209  State Statistics Agency, ‘Public Behavior during Covid-19: 7-14 September 2020’ (September 2020).

210  State Statistics Agency, ‘Public Behavior during Covid-19: 7-14 September 2020’ (September 2020), 5.

211  A Gaduh et al, ‘Lockdown and Mobility in Indonesia’ Center for History and Economics, Harvard University (2021).

212  H Ritchie, ‘Google Mobility Trends: How has the pandemic changed the movement of people around the world?’ Our World in Data (Online, 2 June 2020).

213  Task Force notes that Jakarta has worst social distancing compliance in Java’ CNN Indonesia (Online, 14 July 2021).